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A POLITICALLY VIABLE APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN
DEBT RESTRUCTURING
A. Mechele Dicker son
ABSTRACT
The failure to enact a statutory system to restructure sovereign debt
suggests that the international community is still unwilling to adopt a
unified global response to insolvency issues. Since nations refused to
enact uniform legislation to facilitate more orderly business
insolvencies within a sovereign, it is not surprising that recent
attempts to create uniform legislation that addresses the insolvency of
sovereigns themselves have been unsuccessful. While a
comprehensive statutory approach can predictably and efficiently
restructure all of a sovereign's debts, the failed experience with
uniform cross-border insolvency legislation suggests that sovereigns
will not accept an inflexible statutory scheme that contains
mandatory, uniform terms. Moreover, any system that requires
sovereigns to cede total control of the debt restructuring process to
third parties, that transfers sovereign assets or resources to lenders, or
that subjects sovereigns to the jurisdiction of a nonsovereign court is
not politically viable.
This Article argues that a politically viable approach to resolving
sovereign debt crises is to develop a flexible statutory framework that
encourages sovereigns to activate early restructurings. To give
sovereigns such incentives, the IMF should condition future lending
on sovereigns' willingness to enact basic mandatory debt
restructuring procedures. While sovereigns should be encouraged to
enact comprehensive debt restructuring legislation, they should be
allowed to customize their debt restructuring procedures by
negotiating a private written "protocol" with their creditors. If the
sovereign and its creditors are unable to reach agreement on the
protocol before the sovereign activates the mandatory debt
Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. I am grateful for the research assistance provided
by Angela Montag and Brian Rosenau and to comments, suggestions, and explanations provided by Richard
Brooks and attendees of the Georgetown University Law Center Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
The View from the Legal Academy held on Feb. 26-27, 2004. I thank Professor Mitu Gulati for inviting me to
participate in that conference.
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restructuring provisions (including a brief standstill and stay on
enforcement actions), the restructuring initially should be governed
by paired prodebtor and procreditor default terms selected by a
neutral third-party entity.
INTRODUCTION
The impasse involving the adoption of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (SDRM)' prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF or
Fund) is the second time in recent history that the international community has
resisted adopting a unified global response to insolvency issues. Specifically,
despite widespread consensus that a uniform international statute or treaty is
needed to govern the insolvency proceeding(s) of a multinational business,^ the
international community has rejected all global solutions to cross-border
insolvencies. Since nations are unwilling to enact uniform corporate cross-
border insolvency legislation, it is not surprising that they also have been
unwilling to embrace uniform sovereign debt restructuring legislation.
Sovereign debt restructurings tend to be costly and inefficient largely because
sovereigns fail to enter into early debt renegotiations. Sovereigns appear to
delay both defaulting on their debts and then attempting to restructure those
debts with their creditors because of the political and economic ramifications
associated with default—even though creditors' rights upon default are
limited.'' Indeed, the difficulties creditors face when they attempt to enforce
their contractual rights lead many commentators to argue that any proposal to
resolve the sovereign debt crisis must be governed by the single principle of
protecting, or even enhancing, creditor interests.'' Others suggest that any
system that is not creditor-focused will give sovereigns an incentive to
opportunistically default on debts they can easily repay.^  Even if some
sovereigns may be willing to share control of the debt restructuring process (or
of their assets) with private- or public-sector creditors when they think doing
' Report of the Managing Director to the International Monetary and Financial Committee on a
Statutory Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (Apr. 8, 2003) ("At this stage, there does not appear to be
the requisite support among the Fund membership to establish the [Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism]
through an Amendment of the Fund's Articles."), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/omd/2003/
040803.htm.
See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The ALI
Principles, and EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1 -2 (2002).
See infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
'' See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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SO will allow them to borrow on more favorable terms, national pride and fear
of creditor abuse will prevent sovereigns from agreeing ex ante that creditors
can control the debt restructuring process or the sovereign's assets.
This Article argues that any debt restructuring procedure that requires the
sovereign's political leaders to cede control of the sovereign's assets or the
restructuring process to private creditors or to a multilateral agency (like the
IMF) will not give sovereigns adequate incentives to restructure their debts
early and, moreover, is not politically feasible. Part I of the Article describes
the international community's failed attempts to enact corporate transnational
insolvency legislation and suggests that those legislative efforts failed largely
because sovereigns were unwilling to cede control over firms (or the firm's
assets) located within their borders to creditors located in other countries. This
Part then describes the sovereign debt crisis, briefly explains the typical
progression of sovereign debt restructurings, and suggests that the biggest
impediment to an early sovereign debt restructuring is the sovereign's concern
that entering into debt restructurings will have detrimental economic and
political effects.
Part II discusses the current proposals for resolving the sovereign debt
crisis. While acknowledging the dominant role bonds play in sovereign
lending, this Part argues that contractual approaches standing alone cannot
resolve the sovereign debt crisis because they do not create a single collective
proceeding that binds all creditors. Moreover, adopting a sovereign debt
restructuring system that is effective only if bond debt is the dominant form of
sovereign financing may not work in the long term because there is no
guarantee that bonds will always be the majority of sovereign debt. This Part
also rejects the approach used in the IMF's SDRM largely because of its
infiexibility and because of the degree of control over the restructuring process
the SDRM gives to the Fund. While rejecting the SDRM, this Part concludes
by stressing that a statutory approach is preferable to a contractual one largely
because a statutory approach can best ensure that all the sovereign's debts will
be resolved in an efficient, predictable, collective proceeding.
While any sovereign debt restructuring approach should attempt to protect
creditors' contract rights, Part III argues that the primary goal of a debt
restructuring procedure should be to give sovereigns an incentive to initiate
early discussions with their creditors. Part III proposes that the IMF condition
its future lending on sovereigns' willingness to enact a limited number of
mandatory debt restructuring procedures. Other than enacting these IMF-
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mandated terms, however, sovereigns should be allowed to customize their
debt restructuring procedures based on the structure or complexity of their debt
and their overall economic, political, or cultural needs. To discourage
sovereign and lender moral hazard, there should be a presumption that the IMF
will lend to sovereigns after they activate their restructuring procedures only if
lenders in the capital markets are unwilling to provide postactivation financing.
This Part further suggests that any IMF support package be used to resolve a
liquidity crisis or make limited external debt payments and that the payments
not be used to repay private debt in full. This Part also argues that IMF loans
should contain terms comparable to those available in the capital markets. To
encourage sovereigns to initiate early restructurings, however, loans made to
sovereigns that activate an early, predefault debt restructuring should have
more favorable interest terms than the terms provided in postdefault loans.
Because sovereigns likely will need at least a temporary standstill of their
debt payments. Part III argues that all statutory frameworks should mandate
that the sovereign have a limited reprieve from paying their debts and that
there be a limited (thirty-day) stay of creditor enforcement activities. Though
sovereigns should be encouraged to enact comprehensive debt restructuring
legislation, this Part argues that sovereigns should be allowed to enact only the
IMF-mandated terms. Sovereigns that fail to enact comprehensive debt
restructuring legislation could then customize their debt restructuring
procedures by negotiating a private "protocol" with their creditors. This
Article suggests that instead of creating a new, permanent international
bankruptcy court, sovereigns and their creditors should generally be allowed to
select the entity that will resolve disputes that arise during the restructuring
from a panel drawn from global insolvency experts recommended by
sovereigns or creditors. The IMF-mandated stay on enforcement actions
would expire thirty days after the sovereign starts the restructuring procedure,
but it likely will take more than thirty days to negotiate a permanent protocol
to govern the restructuring. Given this. Part III concludes by arguing that
sovereigns should be bound by an initial temporary protocol that consists of
terms drawn from a menu of options created by a neutral third-party
international organization that is not a sovereign creditor (like the American
Law Institute (ALI) or the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL)) or by an ad hoc group (that consists of representatives
selected by emerging nations and representative creditors). To decrease the
likelihood that sovereigns would select only those options that give strong
debtor protections, the menu should pair prodebtor options (like a permanent
stay of creditor collection activities) with procreditor options (such as allowing
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creditors to initiate the restructuring process) and should mandate that
sovereigns select only the paired options (one sovereign-friendly and one
creditor-friendly).
I. INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CRISES
A. Corporate Cross-Border Insolvencies
Despite the international consensus that a cost effective procedure is
needed to govern a multinational business insolvency, no uniform international
statute, convention, or treaty governs how an insolvency proceeding of a
multinational business (i.e., a transnational or cross-border insolvency) will be
governed. As is true in the sovereign debt context, attempts to resolve cross-
border insolvencies on a voluntary basis often are impeded by individual
creditor enforcement actions and by the requirement that multinational
businesses obtain unanimous creditor consent to change payment terms for the
existing classes of debt.* Several organizations, including UNCITRAL, ALI,
and the Business Law Section of the International Bar Association have drafted
model legislation.^
UNCITRAL drafted model cross-border legislation (the Model Law) that
countries could adopt as part of their domestic laws.^  The Model Law was
designed to help courts recognize, and ultimately be willing to defer to,
insolvency proceedings opened in other countries. The Model Law primarily
See Proposed Framework for Expedited Insolvency Proeedures to Facilitate Cross-Border
Restructurings 2, al http://www.insolvency.ea/papers/ProposedFrameworkForExpeditedInsolvency.pdf (2001);
infra note 82 (discussing the creditor holdout and aggregation problem in sovereign debt restructurings).
' U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, U.N.
Doc. A/52/17, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW], available al
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/insolven/insolvency.htm; AM. LAW INST., GUIDELINES APPLICABLE TO
COURT-TO-COURT COMMUNICATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER CASES (2000), available at http://www.iiiglobal.
org/intemational/projects/ali.pdf; COUNCIL OF THE INT'L BAR ASS 'N , CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
CONCORDAT (Sept. 17, 1995), reprinted in Mike Sigal et al., The Law and Practice of International
Insolvencies. Including a Draft Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, 1994-1995 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW 1, 138-54. The World Bank and IMF also have conducted research or developed
initiatives designed to help nations reform their insolvency laws. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, ORDERLY AND
EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES (1999); The World Bank Group, World Bank Insolvency Initiative
(2002), at http://www.worldbank.org/legal/insolvency ini.html. Other entities that have been involved with
attempts to create enactable cross-border insolvency legislation include the Asian Development Bank and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. See Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy
Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31, 96 (2001) (providing overview of international bankruptcy reform
projects).
* See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 7.
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is a procedural statute whose main goal is to create a higher level of
cooperation between the courts involved in cross-border insolvency. It does
not, however, attempt to harmonize either the procedural or the substantive
provisions of domestic insolvency laws.
ALI also has been involved in efforts to improve cooperation between
national courts that are involved in transnational insolvencies. The ALI
Transnational Insolvency Project developed guidelines and principles that
could be used in transnational insolvency cases involving assets or creditors in
one of the three North American Free Trade Association countries (Canada,
United States, and Mexico).' The Project has not, however, produced a model
procedural law that sovereigns could adopt, nor has it proposed substantive
laws to govern a transnational insolvency. The Project limited its scope to
providing procedural guidelines, largely because those involved with the
Project recognized that neither proposing new substantive laws nor attempting
to harmonize different sovereigns' existing laws would have been politically
feasible.'"
The Business Law Section of the International Bar Association also created
a transnational insolvency initiative, the Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat.
The Concordat created a framework to harmonize cross-border insolvency
proceedings principally by suggesting generalized principles that courts or
parties could incorporate into a private agreement, commonly known as a
"protocol."'' A protocol is essentially a mini-treaty that the courts involved in
a corporate cross-border insolvency agree will be used to govem and
coordinate the insolvency proceeding(s).'^ By proposing general principles
that could then be tailored to fit the circumstances of the proceedings, the
Concordat envisioned a flexible framework that would consider the needs of
sovereigns,'^ creditors,''' and the overall international financial community.'^
' See AM. LAW INST., supra note 7.
'" See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 564-
69 (1996); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 30-33.
' ' The purpose of the Concordat is to suggest generalized principles, which the participants or courts
could tailor to fit the particular circumstances and then adopt as a practical approach toward dealing with the
process. See COUNCIL OF THE INT'L BAR ASS'N, supra note 7.
'^ The first successful use of a protocol in a large transnational insolvency was used in the U.S. and U.K.
bankruptcy proceeding involving Robert Maxwell's commercial enterprises. See Maxwell Communications
Corp. V. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell Communications Corp.), 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). The parties in
Barr v. Charterhouse Group International, Inc. (In re Everfresh Beverages, Inc.), 238 B.R. 558 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999), relied on the principles contained in the Concordat, as did the parties in In re Blackwetl, 267
B.R. 741 (Bankr. W.D.Tex. 2001), and//ire WacteH, 184 B.R. 656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
'•* "[L]egislation refiecting a particular jurisdiction's policies regarding such matters as priorities among
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Moreover, it was specifically designed to serve only as an interim measure
until sovereigns adopted more comprehensive transnational insolvency
legislation,'*
Finally, after years of unsuccessfully attempting to enact a cross-border
insolvency treaty, in 2000 the European Union (EU) finally adopted a
Regulation that introduces conflict of laws rules in insolvency proceedings of a
multinational located in more than one member state,'' Since the EU
1 R
Regulation is binding only on EU members, a multinational business that is
involved in an insolvency proceeding in an EU member state and in the United
States would not be governed by the EU Regulation. The EU Regulation,
which came into force on May 31, 2002, also was not designed to (and does
not attempt to) harmonize either the substantive law or policies of the member
countries,"
Some nations, including the United States, have cross-border insolvency
laws that make it easier for their domestic courts to recognize foreign or
transnational insolvency proceedings,'^ " Those laws (like the EU Regulation)
are not automatically enforceable in other nations and, unless all nations enact
legislation that recognizes another sovereign's insolvency proceedings, the
effect and enforceability of a nation's domestic legislation will be confined to
the borders of the enacting country,^' Indeed, even when countries have
claims , . . must be given due weight where jurisdictionally appropriate, as should regulatory laws governing
businesses such as banking or insurance," COUNCIL OF THE INT'L BAR ASS'N, supra note 7, at 139,
''' "[T]hese principles should reflect respect for the legitimate private expectations of the parties
transacting business with the debtor, including their reasonable reliance upon laws of particular jurisdictions."
Id.
" "To be supportive of international commerce, any insolvency regime must be reasonably predictable,
fair and convenient." Id.
'* "The Concordat is not intended to be used as, or as a substitute for, a treaty or statute but is intended to
guide practitioners in harmonizing cross-border insolvencies in the absence of governing treaties or statutes."
Id. at 140.
'^ Council Regulation 1346/2000 of May 29, 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1,
available at http://europa.eu,int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_l 60/116020000630en00010018.pdf
'* Denmark is not bound by the regulation. Id. (33), 2000 O.J, (L 160) 1,4.
" Sprecher Grier Halberstam LLP, European Insolvency Regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346
of 2000: SGH Keynotes, at http://www.sghlaw.com/european insolvency_regulation.htm (last revised Jan. 6,
2003).
2" See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000).
^' For example, while § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code purports to give the U.S. court that is deciding a
cross-border insolvency case jurisdiction over all assets of the multinational business, if assets are located in
another nation, U.S. courts cannot force that nation to turn over the assets. Id. § 541. Similarly, while § 362 of
the Code provides that almost all creditor collection activities are stayed upon the filing of the bankruptcy
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enacted parts of the various model laws,^ ^ these enactments cannot globally
resolve the problems raised with cross-border insolvencies, largely because the
model lavi's do not even attempt to harmonize insolvency laws. Though
harmonization arguably is the best solution, creating a single transnational
insolvency law is not politically viable at least for the near future. Indeed,
even the most ardent advocates of uniform transnational insolvency laws
recognize "the difficulty of achieving legal integration in the complex field of
insolvency"^^ and concede that "a single international bankruptcy law
administered by a single international court system" is, at least for now,
implausible. '^'
The international community's refusal to enact uniform corporate cross-
border insolvency legislation stems, in large part, from the wholesale effects
that a large corporate insolvency has on nations involved with the
multinational and also on nations' unwillingness to give assets located within
its borders to nonforum creditors.^' Countries may also resist enacting
transnational insolvency legislation because it (like sovereign debt
case, the U.S. court lacks jurisdiction to enforce this injunction against a non-U.S. creditor who violates it by
seizing assets in another nation. Id. § 362.
The U.S. Congress has proposed stronger cross-border insolvency legislation. A new Chapter 15, based
on the Model Law, is part of comprehensive bankruptcy reform legislation that has been stalled for almost a
decade because of controversial consumer provisions that would use a means test to determine consumer
debtors' eligibility for bankruptcy relief Though the cross-border insolvency provisions are not controversial
and are distinct from (and could be implemented independently of) the controversial consumer provisions,
congressional leaders appear unwilling to pass any individual part of that legislative package. See 150 CONG.
REC. H212-13 (Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of Rep. Baldwin) (indicating that favorable, noncontroversial parts of
bankruptcy reform legislation were used as pawns to help passage of the comprehensive bankruptcy reform
bill); 149 CONO. REC. S1O,6O4 (daily ed. July 31, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (commenting that part of
reform legislation was being "used as leverage" for the controversial larger bankruptcy reform bill).
^^  Only Mexico appears to have fully embraced and implemented the principles contained in the
UNCITRAL Model Law in enacting domestic insolvency legislation. Japan, Poland, Romania, Spain, and the
Republic of Montenegro (a member of the Yugoslav Federation) have adopted legislation that contains many
of the principles of the Model Law. See E. Bruce Leonard, The International Year in Review, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Dec. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 76, 77-78. South Africa passed legislation designed to enact the Model Law,
though it does not appear to have been implemented. See id. at 77. The United Kingdom, Argentina,
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada also have considered legislation that would adopt the model law. Id. at
78; see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MlCH. L. REV. 2276,
2278-79 (2000) (discussing legislative proposals).
^^ Westbrook, supra note 22, at 2292.
^^ Id. at 2294 (arguing that a universal transnational bankruptcy system is possible, though likely not in
the short term); see also Donna McKenzie, International Solutions to International Insolvency: An Insoluble
Problem?, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 15, 17 (1997) (observing that harmonization was "the guiding light of some
earlier efforts" in cross-border legislative proposals but "has now been accepted by many as an unrealistic goal
for the foreseeable fiiture").
^' See Tung, supra note 7, at 45-48 (discussing difficulty of harmonizing countries' bankruptcy laws).
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restructuring legislation) necessarily will implicate a number of substantive
areas of the law (tax, labor, private contract) and may have devastating effects
on the sovereign's economy.^ * Finally, nations appear to have resisted
attempts to enact any of the legislative proposals because the proposals did not
sufficiently consider nations' political and cultural differences and their
divergent views on the appropriate methods and goals of a bankruptcy
B. Sovereign Debt Crisis
1. Background
No one cause is cited to explain why developing nations have increasingly
faced financial crises since the 1990s, and there appears to be no way to predict
when a crisis will occur. Indeed, there is widespread consensus that both the
reasons for sovereign financial crises and the manner in which they are
resolved are unique.'^ ^ Though countries may face debt crises for any number
of reasons,^' most agree that it is imperative that sovereigns, once in a crisis,
make certain economic changes and then quickly attempt to resolve the
^' Id. at 47; cf. Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, Improving the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process:
Problems in Restructuring, Proposed Solutions, and a Roadmap for Reform 5 (Mar. 9, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript) (discussing the disruptive effect a default has on a country's fmancial system), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/roubini-setserO303.pdf.
^ ' Tung, supra note 7, at 48; c/? Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate
Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 63 (1992) (stating that the more diverse parties are, the less likely it will be
that a universal rule will be created).
^ ' See Peter B. Kenen, The International Financial Architecture: Old Issues and New Initiatives, INT'L
FIN., Spring 2002, at 23, 25-26; Alfred Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure: A Perspective of Counsel to Agent
Banks. Bank Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 60 (1984); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956,
975 (2000); Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors, 37 INT'L LAW. 103, 104-05 (2003)
(citing data).
^ ' Reasons given for the most recent sovereign default crises include weak fmancial systems, the
government's decision to guarantee foreign debts of their insolvent (or nearly insolvent) domestic banks, the
insolvency of large nonfmancial entities in the country, international economic sanctions, internal political
instability or poor governance, excessive fiscal deficits or levels of public debt, high inflation, low savings
rates, fall in the growth of (or weak prices for) exports, sudden reversals in capital inflows, exchange rate
depreciation or devaluation, and contagion. See JEAN TlROLE, FINANCIAL CRISES, LIQUIDITY, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 5, 7-12, 37 (2002); Richard Brealey, The Asian Crisis: Lessons for Crisis
Management and Prevention, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 471, 472-
74 (Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing eds., 2002) (suggesting that high levels of bank borrowing and
maturity and currency mismatches rendered banks insolvent and triggered sovereign fmancial crisis); Kenen,
supra note 28, at 25-26; Anne O. Krueger, The Need to Improve the Resolution of Financial Crises: An
Emerging Consensus, Address Before the Finance Club of Harvard University Business School (Mar. 27,
2003), available at http://www.imf org/extemal/np/speeches/2003/032703.htm.
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crisis/" Currently, sovereigns that are facing either a solvency or liquidity^'
crisis lack adequate incentives to promptly and efficiently resolve the crisis and
often wait too long to initiate a debt restructuring, thus increasing the
likelihood of default and the costs associated with the delayed attempt to
renegotiate the debt.^ ^ Indeed, despite the recent interest in creating a
framework to help sovereigns restructure their debts, few willingly default.^ ^
Sovereigns appear reluctant to default for three main reasons. First,
countries resist defaulting (or even approaching their creditors predefault to
restructure their debts) because they fear that there will be economic
dislocation, including harm to their domestic banking system, and political
upheaval. '^' When a sovereign's leaders initiate a debt restructuring, the
^^  Changes sovereigns should make include limiting disruptions to the domestic economy, correcting
macroeconomic imbalances, stemming capital outflows, and restoring confidence in the sovereign's economy.
See Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Board Discusses Economic Policy Issues Arising in the Context of a Sovereign
Debt Restructuring 2 (Int'l Monetary Fund Public Information Notice No. 03/42, Apr. 2, 2003), at
http://wwvf.imforg/extemal/np/sec/pn/2003/pn0342.htm.
•*' A solvency crisis occurs when a country cannot pay its ultimate debts from its then owed assets. See
John H. Chun, Note, "Post Modern " Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did Mexico Need an International Bankruptcy
Forum?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2659 n.lOl (1996); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1400 (7th ed.
1999) (stating that the definition of "solvency" is the "ability to pay debts as they come due"). In contrast, a
country has a liquidity crisis when it lacks sufficient currency immediately available to meet its creditors'
demands. Chun, supra, at 2652 n.44; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 942 (stating that liquidity
is "the state of being readily convertible into cash").
Though it is not always clear whether the financial crisis is a liquidity or solvency crisis, some suggest
that responses to a sovereign's fmancial crisis and proposals to prevent debt crises should vary depending on
whether the crisis is a liquidity or solvency crisis. See Kenen, supra note 28, at 32.
•'•^  Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317,
1360 (2002) (observing that "if history teaches any lesson, it is that sovereigns often delay taking necessary
debt management measures until a point when the severity of those measures is needlessly aggravated"); Anne
Krueger, Int'l Monetary Fund, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign
Debt Restructuring, Address Before National Economists' Club, Ameriean Enterprise Institute (Nov. 26, 2001)
("[T]oo many countries with insurmountable debt problems wait too long, imposing unnecessarily heavy
eeonomic costs on themselves, and on the international community that has to help pick up the pieces."),
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2001/112601 .htm.
'^ Political leaders may be inclined to repudiate debts incurred by a prior repressive governmental
regime—especially if the new leaders conclude that repaying those debts is not in the best interest of the
sovereign's citizens because the prior leaders used the proeeeds from those loans for personal activities. For a
general discussion of the problem of "odious" debt, see Anupam Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 EMORY
L.J. 923 (2004).
^'' See. e.g., ANNE O. KRUECER, INT'L MONETARY FUND, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING 2 (2002); Brealey, supra note 29, at 480 (stating that countries that receive IMF assistance
suffer domestic unrest and undergo changes in both the government and administration of the central bank);
Scott, supra note 28, at 110-11 (citing the continuing deterioration in the Argentine economy after announcing
debt defaults); Jody Daniel Newman, Note, Exchange Controls and Foreign Loan Defaults: Force Majeure as
an Alternative Defense, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1499, 1499 n.l (1986); Int'l Monetary Fund, Proposals for a
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM): A Factsheet, at http://www.imforg/extemal/np/exr/
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restructuring necessarily is a political process that will be shaped by the
leaders' ability to effectively negotiate with groups (both domestic and
external) that will be affected by any proposed reforms.^ ^ These leaders will
only propose compositions that will not significantly harm the country's
citizens, because the leaders realize that a debt restructuring that triggers a
recession, forces severe cuts in public expenditures on social programs, or
increases taxes likely will cause citizens to oust them at the next available
opportunity.'^
Sovereigns also avoid debt restructurings because of their concern that
default signals that the sovereign is not creditworthy and that such a signal
diminishes a sovereign's reputation in, and access to, international capital
markets.'^ Finally, sovereigns likely avoid debt restructurings because of
uncertainty: with no uniform framework available to restructure all debts,
sovereigns cannot reasonably predict whether the restructuring will be
successful. The fear of suffering the consequences of defaulting on debt
obligations also appears to cause sovereigns to delay initiating restructuring
discussions with their creditors and instead to engage in other more costly
activities to avoid ^^
facts/sdrm.htm (Jan. 2003).
•*' Domestic debtholders likely will be politically powerful banks, pension funds, or other political elites
whose support will be needed for any successful restructuring. See Anna Gelpem, Sovereign Debt Crisis:
Creditor's Rights vs. Development (Beyond Balancing the Interests of Creditors and Developing States), 97
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L . PROC. 221, 221 -22 (2003).
' * See LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR A D HOC MACHINERY 111-12
(2003) (discussing political factors involved with sovereign debt workouts); J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing
Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the
Struggle for Peoples' Rights in Africa, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 851, 868 (2003) (discussing government's
duty to protect citizens from acts of private parties); Cynthia Mullock, Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Proposals and Their Effects on Emerging Markets Debt Investment, CHAZEN W E B J. lNT'L Bus., Fall 2003, at
2 (stating that sovereign's primary duty is to its citizens when restructuring sovereign debt), at http://www-
l.gsb.columbia.edu/joumals/files/chazen/SDR_proof.pdf.
•'^  See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Best Interest of
Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004); Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, The Role of Institutions
in Reputation Models of Sovereign Debt, 35 J. MONETARY ECON. 45, 46 (1995); Anne O. Krueger, The
Difference Is in the Debt: Crisis Resolution in Latin America, Address at the Latin America Conference on
Sector Reform (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.imf.Org/extemal/np/speeches/2003/l 11403a.htm.
'* See Jeremy Bulow, First World Governments and Third World Debt: A Bankruptcy Court for
Sovereign Lending?, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 2002:1, at 229, 232 (William C. Brainard
& George L. Perry eds., 2003) (stating that countries sometimes issue excessive amounts of short-term debt in
an attempt to avoid defaulting on existing debt), available at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/es/commentary
/joumals/bpea_macro/papers/200204_bulow.pdf; Barry Eichengreen, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, J. EcON.
PERSP., Fall 2003, at 75, 75 (stating that countries run down cash reserves, and increase interest rates to avoid
suspending debt payments).
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When a sovereign defaults on its debts, its creditors have significantly
fewer options than do the creditors of a distressed business. For example,
unlike a defaulting business, a sovereign cannot be seized by its creditors and
liquidated. Moreover, because nearly all sovereign lending is unsecured,
creditors do not have the right to seize collateral to satisfy their claims upon
default.^' Even if the loans are collateralized, sovereign creditors have limited
enforcement rights since they likely will be unable to enforce their claims in
the sovereign's own courts and can only enforce those obligations in the courts
of a few other nations, most notably the United States and United Kingdom.'*"
Because a distressed sovereign is unlikely to leave attachable assets in any
country (especially the United States or the United Kingdom), many argue that
a sovereign's creditors have little power to enforce their contractual obligations
and must instead rely on the sovereign's fear of damage to its reputation to
induce it to pay its bills.'"
2. Current Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process
Sovereigns can reschedule official bilateral debt through an informal
arrangement known as the Paris Club,''^  if the IMF has certified that the
country cannot meet its debt service obligations and the country agrees to
comply with certain policy changes specified by the IMF.''^  Though the
restructuring procedures used in Paris Club negotiations are not particularly
transparent,'*'' sovereigns and their official creditors tend to reach agreement
quickly (and relatively inexpensively) in a Paris Club rescheduling, often
because these public creditors are willing to make concessions based on
' ' See Bulow, supra note 38, at 4. See generally CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR
SOVEREIGN DEBTORS (Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes eds., 1995).
Sovereigns can be sued in the courts of these two countries because those countries have relaxed their
laws on sovereign immunity. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 §§ 2(a), 4(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1605-1607 (2000); State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, §§ 1(1), 2-11 (Eng.).
See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 37; Anna Gelpem, How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign
Debt, iNT'L FIN. L. REV., May 2003, at 19 (discussing argument that default be made "unspeakably horrible"
to combat the challenge creditors face in collecting their claims from a debtor whose assets are largely
inaccessible).
^^ The members of the Paris Club include the large creditor nations and also are the large shareholders of
the IMF. Permanent members include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, and
Japan. See RiEFFEL, supra note 36, at 64 n. 11 (listing members).
" ' Seeid.am-18.
'^ W. at81, 103.
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political considerations.''^ However, even an efficient resolution of public debt
does not obviate the need for distressed sovereigns to restructure their private
debt. Private negotiations between sovereigns and their private commercial
bank lenders, in an arrangement known as the London Club, tend to be
lengthier and more expensive.''^  Various reasons are cited to explain why
London Club negotiations are not as efficient as Paris Club restructurings.
First, unlike the relatively limited number of public-sector creditors involved
with Paris Club restructurings, private commercial creditors tend to be the ones
involved with London Club negotiations, and reaching an agreement requires
almost unanimous creditor consent."*^  Moreover, unlike the official public
creditors in a Paris Club negotiation, commercial banks are less likely to
forgive debt for political or other nonfinancial reasons."**
While sovereigns and their public or private creditors are attempting to
restructure the sovereign's debts, intemational financial institutions (IFIs) are
asked (and often expected) to offer new loans to the sovereigns. Where the
IMF is the IFI, the loans are conditioned on the sovereign reforming certain
economic policies."*' Though no one disputes that sovereigns in a financial
crisis need additional financing, IMF lending is controversial. In general, the
IMF will lend to sovereigns when private lenders will not and on terms not
offered by capital market lenders. Moreover, the IMF often lends in its
capacity as an intemational development institution that provides humanitarian
**' See id. at 82 (stating that Paris Club creditors have never charged sovereigns a restructuring fee); .see
also Michelle J. White, Sovereigns in Distress: Do They Need Bankruptcy?, in BROOKINOS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 2002:1, supra note 38, at 14.
''* See RIEFFEL, supra note 36, at 130; Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1396, 1411 (1997); Scott, supra note 28, at 106; White, supra note 45, at 14-15. But cf
Arturo C. Porzecanski, Dealing with Sovereign Debt: Trends and Implications, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE
CROSSROADS (Chris Jochnik & Fraser Preston eds., forthcoming 2004) (arguing that bondholders and banks
have helped to expeditiously resolve the sovereign debt crisis, whereas official bilateral and multilateral
agencies have been unwilling to make substantial concessions quickly), available at http://www.law.
georgetown.edu/intemational/documents/Porzecanski_OOO.pdf
"" White, supra note 45, at 14.
"** See RIEFFEL, supra note 36, at 112 (observing that London Club banks routinely resist pressure from
the IMF or the Paris Club to accept commercially indefensible restructuring terms simply for the purpose of
advancing political objectives); Scott, supra note 28, at 106.
•" The IMF conditionality seeks to influence the behavior of governments that accept the IMF loans by
encouraging them to pursue different long-term programs and policies such as closing insolvent fmancial
institutions and nonviable firms, strengthening legal systems and fmancial laws, and creating policies to
protect low-income groups. See TiROLE, supra note 29, at 17; Scott, supra note 28, at 95. In theory, once
private lenders see that the country has accepted certain economic reforms, they will view it as more
creditworthy and will be willing to lend to it, thus eliminating the need for ongoing IMF loans. See GRAHAM
BIRD, THE IMF AND THE FUTURE: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FACING THE FUND 142,181 (2003).
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aid, rather than as a financial institution that makes lending decisions based
solely on the sovereign's borrowing capacity.'" Others argue that IMF lending
decisions are driven by the economic or political desires of its politically
powerful members (often the United States) who demand that the IMF lend to
sovereigns that owe money to the members' domestic banking institutions^' or
who insist that IMF support packages be given to countries for geopolitical
(not economic) reasons.^ ^ Some critics suggest that the IMF should narrow its
focus by providing short-term emergency lending to sovereigns that are facing
a liquidity crisis and that it should not attempt to act as a lender of last resort to
help resolve a sovereign's insolvency crisis.^''
While few contend that IMF lending is always inappropriate, commentators
argue that the prospect of an IMF support package arguably''' creates a moral
hazard risk by encouraging countries both to maintain domestic economic
policies that are not fiscally sound and to borrow recklessly from private
capital markets. The belief that the IMF will provide funds either to prevent a
' " For example, the IMF often lends to one country to prevent a liquidity crisis from worsening into a
solvency crisis and to prevent one country's crisis from spreading to neighboring countries. See Eric Dorkin,
Development, the IMF, and Institutional Investors: The Mexican Crisis, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
247, 268 (1999); Chun, supra note 31, at 2648-49; Mary C. Tsai, Note, Globalization and Conditionatily: Two
Sides of the Sovereignty Coin, 31 L A W & P O L ' Y I N T ' L B U S . 1317, 1325-26(2000).
^ ' See INT'L FIN. INSTS. ADVISORY COMM., 106TH CONG., I F I A C (MELTZER) COMMISSION REPORT 44
(Mar. 2000) [hereinafter MELTZER REPORT] ("The IMF should not be used as a 'slush fund' to satisfy
decisions of the G-7 fmance ministers or other groups of powerful members. Such practices undermine the
IMF's role as a supplier of liquidity, [and] distort the incentives of lenders and borrowers in international
capital markets . . . . " ) , available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.pdf
'^ See BIRD, supra note 49, at 6, 44-49; RiEFFEL, supra note 36, at 53, 111 (arguing that prior lending to
Poland was supported by IMF members because Poland chose to break out of the Soviet bloc and that lending
to Jordan was deemed necessary to help support its campaign against terrorism).
^^ Some commentators have suggested that the IMF narrow its focus to exchange rate regimes, monetary
policy, and fiscal policy and that it limit its support packages to countries that reach unsustainable debt levels.
See IMF, World Bank Overhaul: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of
John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs), republished as Grants and
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Two Key Elements of a Reform Agenda for the International Financial
Institutions, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/pol016.htm). Others argue that the IMF should
not and cannot serve as a lender of last resort. See Forrest Capie, Can There Be an International Lender-of-
Last-Resort?, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT, supra note 29, at 437,
447-48 (stating that there can be no international lender of last resort because there is no international
currency); Anna J. Schwartz, Earmarks of a Lender of Last Resort, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND
THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT, supra note 29, at 449, 458-59 (suggesting that emerging countries can now
raise funds from private international markets); Scott, supra note 28, at 112 (expressing the view that the IMF
is not a classical lender of last resort because it cannot print its own currency).
^'' Without empirical support, it is impossible to state defmitely whether IMF lending practices leads to a
sovereiga/borrower moral hazard problem. See Brealey, supra note 29, at 480 (suggesting that the moral
hazard danger likely is overstated, although recognizing that "it is difficult to provide convincing evidenee" to
refute assertions of that danger).
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default or to help facilitate a postdefault debt restructuritig causes sovereigns to
make risky borrowing decisions, atid any future IMF "bailout" also insulates
sovereigns from the costs of the itnprudent borrowing.^ ^ Even if, as many
argue, countries would not willingly adhere to reckless financial policies while
simply waiting for an IMF bailout,'^ IMF lending arguably creates a lender
moral hazard problem as well. That is, the prospect of a support package from
the IMF arguably encourages creditors to take excessive risks and lend
recklessly: once the IMF provides a financial package to a distressed
sovereign, the creditors are then insulated from the costs of their inadequate
risk assessment." Moreover, if the sovereign defaults or initiates debt
restructuring negotiations to avoid defaulting, the prospect of an IMF support
package also is said to distort creditors' incentives during those debt
renegotiations by causing them to reflise to make meaningful concessions.^^
In short, although creditors have limited enforcement rights if a sovereign
defaults on its debts, sovereigns are reluctant to default or even to initiate early
debt renegotiations with their creditors. Even when sovereigns do initiate debt
restructurings, the existing procedures to restructure their debts take too long,
are too expensive, and often fail to result in a renegotiation of all debts.^' A
system that leads to a quick, predictable, and orderly restructuring of the
sovereign's private and public debt would ultimately reduce the future cost of
sovereign borrowing, because creditors would receive a higher recovery under
such a system and this should cause them to decrease the cost of sovereign
See Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 961-62; Scott, supra note 28, at 115 (concluding that sovereigns
incurred "more debt or engaged in less prudent fiscal and monetary policies than they otherwise would have
had they known no official support would be forthcoming").
*^ Not all agree that countries happily borrow from the IMF or that the risk of moral hazard has no
restraints. See BIRD, supra note 49, at 197 ("[M]ost countries find borrowing from the Fund sufficiently
unpalatable that they only do it as a last resort, when all other options have been closed. Since crisis situations
usually require crisis solutions, IMF conditionality tends to be strict."); Schwarez, supra note 28, at 962 n.28
(recognizing that sovereigns will prefer to avoid the reduced autonomy over their economies that IMF
conditionality imposes).
See Scott, supra note 28, at 113 (suggesting that private creditors are more likely to make bad loans if
they will be bailed out by the IMF). But cf. Brealey, supra note 29, at 475-76 (presenting the sharply divided
opinions over the effectiveness of the IMF and its role in causing sovereign debt crises).
See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 37 (discussing potential moral hazards posed by IMF emergency
liquidity loans); Eichengreen, supra note 38, at 7-8 (discussing validity of lender moral hazard problem);
Kenen, supra note 28, at 26.
^' Thomas I. Palley, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: What Is the Problem? 2 (Jan. 22, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript) (observing that "restructuring negotiations under both the Paris and London club arrangements are
long and uncertain, giving rise to economic dislocation during the negotiating period"), available at
http://www.imf org/Extemal/NP/EXR/seminars/2003/sdmi/pdf/palley.pdf
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lending.*^ As Part II notes, however, which resolution is best has been the
subject of heated debate for the last few years.
II. CURRENT PROPOSALS TO RESOLVE THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
A. Contractual Proposals
1. Background
Lending to emerging nations has vacillated over the last two centuries
between bank and bond lending. Though bond lending was the dominant form
of sovereign debt financing in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,^'
bank lending was the most common form of sovereign debt financing for most
of the twentieth century.*^ Indeed, commercial banks (largely through
medium- to long-term syndicated bank loan agreements) provided most of the
lending to sovereigns until the 1990s.*^ The composition of sovereign debt
financing changed dramatically in the 1990s largely due to losses banks
sustained in the Latin American crises in the 1980s." Starting in the 1990s,
the amount of sovereign debt to banks significantly decreased*^ and now the
majority of external sovereign debt is in the form of bond debt.** The change
from bank to bond debt also appears to have changed the dynamics of
sovereign debt restructuring negotiations.
The dominance of bond lending created a coordination problem for
sovereigns by increasing the number of creditors with which the sovereign
would have to negotiate if it needed to restructure its debts. While bank
lending in the 1970s and 1980s largely consisted of syndicated loans that
involved a limited number of participants, significantly more bondholders are
' " See Eichengreen, supra note 38, at 77-78.
*' See Enrique Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and Controlling
Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 546-48 (1996); Rory Macmillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L.
305,336-37(1995).
See RiEFFEL, supra note 36, at 96 (noting that bond debt was the bulk of sovereign lending for more
than 100 years before World War II).
*' See id. at 107; Lee C. Buehheit, Cross-Border Lending: What's Different This Time?, 16 Nw. J. INT'L
L.& Bus. 44,46-51 (1995).
^ Bratton & Gulati, supra note 37; Sehwarcz, supra note 28, at 1004.
Scott, supra note 28, at 106-12 (chronicling crises in Mexico, Asia, Russia, Ecuador, Turkey,
Argentina, and Brazil).
** Buehheit & Gulati, supra note 32, at 1334-35 (discussing evolution of emerging market borrowing).
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involved with individual bond issues.*^ Bargaining with bank lenders was
relatively simple, because sovereigns had to negotiate with only a limited
number of creditors and the large banks were repeat players who expected to
have ongoing lending relationships with the sovereigns.*^ This expectation of
future lending arrangements gave the lenders an incentive to compromise their
existing claims during debt restructurings in anticipation of future lending
opportunities with the sovereign.*' Unlike repeat player bank lenders,
bondholders have little incentive to compromise their claims because they have
no expectation of an ongoing relationship with the sovereign.'" Moreover,
even if bondholders act in good faith during the negotiations and do not engage
in self-interested opportunistic behavior, restructuring bond debt is logistically
challenging because of the sheer number of agreements a sovereign must
reach, because the turnover of the bond owners increases the time and cost
involved in contacting new owners to negotiate with them, and because
governmental entities no longer can use regulatory incentives or moral suasion
to convince the now-dispersed group of bondholders to renegotiate the
sovereign's debts.''
2. Majority Action Clauses
While restructuring commercial banking debt through the London Club
may be slow and somewhat cumbersome, there is at least a collective forum
sovereigns can use to restructure bank debt. Currently, no such forum exists to
restructure bond debt. The greatest impediment to reaching a quick,
inexpensive, and comprehensive restructuring agreement with bondholders has
been the presence of unanimous action clauses (UACs) in bond contracts.
UACs condition the amendment of the bond contract's payment terms on the
*' See Eichengreen, supra note 38, at 36.
** See Getpem, supra note 41, at 19. But see Roubini & Setser, supra note 26, at 31 n.27 (suggesting that
sovereign debt restructurings with bank syndicates were not as efficient as they are currently portrayed).
' ' See RiEFFEL, supra note 36, at 111 ("The driving motivation for most banks . . . was the desire to
continue doing business with the debtor country.").
'" Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 1005 n.285.
" Eichengreen, supra note 38, at 264-65; Joseph J. Norton, "International Financial Law," an
Increasingly Important Component of "International Economic Law": A Tribute to Professor John H.
Jackson, 20 MiCH. J. INT'L L. 133, 142 (1999); Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 1004-05; Richard Euliss,
Comment, The Feasibility of the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: An Alternative Statutory
Approach to Mollify American Reservations, 19 AM. U. INT'LL. REV. 107, 112-13 (2003); Anne O. Krueger,
New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, Address Before Institute for
International Economics (Apr. 1, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2002/040102.
htm.
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unanimous consent of the bondholders.^^ Bonds governed by English law
contain collection action clauses (CACs), which allow bondholders to amend
payment terms by an affirmative vote of a supermajority (typically seventy-
five percent) of the bondholders.^ ^ Most sovereign bonds are issued on the
New York bond market and until very recently always contained UACs.^ "
Since even an overwhelming majority of the holders of New York bonds
cannot renegotiate payment terms absent unanimous bondholder consent, if the
sovereign's bonds contain UACs, it cannot force recalcitrant bondholders to
accept a restructuring agreement even if it is acceptable to the majority of the
bondholders.^ ^ Moreover, because they cannot be forced to compromise their
claims, rogue bondholders can coerce a sovereign into giving them a better
deal by refusing to accept an offer that is acceptable to the majority of
bondholders. Likewise, because they are not bound by any decision the
sovereign reaches with other bondholders, recalcitrant bondholders can attempt
to collect their claims by accelerating the debt or filing an attachment
proceeding against the sovereign in a foreign court even if the other
bondholders have agreed to forbear from collecting their claims during the debt
restructuring negotiations.^^
Despite the challenges sovereigns face when they attempt to restructure
bond debt, many (especially those in the private sector) argue that the best
solution to resolving the sovereign debt crises is a private contractual
^^  The Trust Indenture Trust Act of 1939 prohibits reductions in payment terms of publicly issued
corporate bonds unless all bondholders consent. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000). While this Act does not apply to
sovereign bonds, the drafters of New York sovereign bonds routinely include the unanimity requirement in
those bonds. Nonpayment terms can be changed by a smaller majority, typically fifty to sixty percent of the
bondholders. Id.
'^ See Under Secretary of the Treasury John B. Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S.
Perspective, Address Before Institute for International Economics (Apr. 2, 2002), available al http://
www.iie.com/publications/papers/taylor0402.htm.
'' ' Eichengreen, supra note 38, at 13. Bonds issued in New York contain choice-of-law clauses that give
New York courts jurisdiction to hear almost all matters arising out of the bond contract. See Lee C. Buchheit
& G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 59 (2000). Since 2001,
Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hungary, Italy, the Philippines, Venezuela, and several other emerging
countries have issued bonds, including some of investment-grade category, with CACs. Sergio J. Galvis &
Angel L. Saad, Collective Action Clauses: Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2004).
'^ See Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 961 n.25 (discussing the difficulty Brazil faced in restructuring its
debts when its fourth largest creditor held out and refused to convert Brazil's debt into collateralized bonds).
'* One commentator has suggested that one way to eliminate the collective action problem and curb
rogue creditors is for the United States and the United Kingdom to repeal their sovereign immunity laws,
because this would prevent creditors from attaching assets in nonsovereign courts. See Bulow, supra note 38,
at 14-15.
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approach.^ ^ Specifically, commentators suggest that exchange offers and exit
amendments can be used to encourage bondholders whose bonds contain
UACs to agree to restructure the debt. During an exchange offer,
bondholders are asked to exchange voluntarily their old bonds for new ones
that generally contain terms more favorable to the bondholders, but that also
contain CACs.^' In theory, bondholders would agree to accept these more
favorable bonds, even though doing so requires them to exchange bonds with
UACs for bonds with CACs. In practice, not all bondholders will agree to
these substitute bonds either because they may not understand the offer or
because they want to hold out for a better offer. Thus, exchange offers often
are combined with exit consents that operate by requiring bondholders who
agree to accept the new bonds to automatically consent to amendments of
nonpayment terms in the old bonds. These amendments would be designed to
impair the secondary-market value of the old bonds or otherwise make them
less attractive to hold, which should give the holders of the old bonds a strong
incentive to accept the new bonds.^"
A contractual approach to resolving a sovereign debt crisis, though
appealing because it leaves the process in the hands of privately bargaining
parties, does not provide a comprehensive solution to the sovereign debt crisis.
First, even if all new bonds contained CACs, there would still be a creditor
coordination problem because the holders of old, longer maturity bonds could
still rely on the UACs in those bonds to thwart the sovereign's debt
restructuring negotiations. Though the holders of old bonds with UACs could
be encouraged to exchange those bonds for new bonds with CACs by using
exit consents, even some supporters of a contractual approach have questioned
whether courts would be willing to enforce exit consents that radically altered
' ' See BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 65-70
(1999); GROUP OF TEN, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES: A REPORT TO THE MINISTERS AND
GOVERNORS PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DEPUTIES (1996) (proposing draft CAC clauses),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gtenO3.pdf; Taylor, supra note 53. The International Primary Market
Association (a London-based association of underwriters that issue market practices for international bonds),
the Institute of International Finance (which represents the largest private fmancial institutions), and several
other private sector organizations (collectively known as the "Gang of 6") publicly support an increased use of
CACs to resolve the sovereign debt crisis and developed a template that could be used in future bond issues.
See Gelpem, supra note 35; Letter from Charles H. Dallara, Managing Director, Inst. of Int'l Fin., to The
Honorable Gordon Brown, Chairman, Int'l Monetary & Fin. Comm. (Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://
www.iif.com/data/public/icdc0402.pdf; see also Kenen, supra note 28, at 31 -34.
'* See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 74, at 59.
" 5ee Krueger, supra note 29 (discussing exchange offers).
*" Bratton & Gulati, supra note 37; Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 74, at 65-70; see also KRUEGER, supra
note 34, at 31.
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the nonpayment terms of the bond contract.^' In addition, an exchange offer
plus exit consent might not work if the issuer is forced to pay a premium to
convince a sufficient majority of the old bondholders to accept the new bonds,
something sovereigns may be unable to afford.
Even if CACs are included in all bond contracts, there still may be a
holdout problem, because one creditor or a small group of creditors could
purchase a blocking position and cause the bond to be accelerated, prevent the
debt from being restructured, or otherwise extract better terms for themselves
at the expense of other bondholders.^ '^  In addition, even if CACs could solve
the creditor holdout problem among holders of individual bond issuers, they do
not provide for the aggregation of holders across bond issues. '^' Likewise, they
cannot fully solve the creditor holdout problem for nonbondholder creditors.
That is, although bond lending is now the dominant form of sovereign
financing, lending to sovereigns has switched between bondholders and
commercial banks several times over the last two hundred years and there is no
way to determine whether bond, syndicated bank, or some other form of
lending will be the most common form of sovereign financing in the future.
An increased use of CACs (even with exchange offers plus exit consents)
would not solve the coordination problem, because banks, trade creditors, and
the sovereign's domestic creditors would not be bound by the CACs and would
instead have the right to insist that the sovereign engage in individual
negotiations with them through slower, costlier proceedings.
In short, with a pure contractual approach, the sovereign would need to do
at least the following: issue new bonds with CACs; have multiple exchange
offers that included legally enforceable exit consents; negotiate with all
nonbondholder creditors; then, convince all bondholders across all issues and
all nonbondholder creditors to agree to the proposed restructuring. This
process, while perhaps not as burdensome as Paris Club negotiations or
negotiating with a multitude of bondholders whose bonds contain UACs,
would still be time-consuming and could be extremely costly. Thus, although
sovereigns and the capital markets now seem willing to accept New York
^' Bratton & Gulati, supra note 37; Scott, supra note 28, at 119 (questioning whether U,S. courts would
uphold changes to bond terms if the minority bondholders were being abused).
*^  For a comprehensive discussion of holdout creditors and a suggestion that these creditors actually add
value in the international financial architecture, see Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or
Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043 (2004).
^^ But cf. Eichengreen, supra note 38, at 22 (discussing use of representative committees to address the
cross-issue coordination problem).
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bonds containing CACs,^ "* a contractual approach remains an incomplete
solution to the creditor coordination problem. For that reason, the international
community must seriously consider the viability of a statutory approach.
B. Statutory Approach
1. IMF Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
a. Summary
The IMF presented the current sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
or
(SDRM) model in 2001. The model proposed a treaty framework that would
create, then implement, the SDRM by amending the IMF's Articles as long as
three-fifths of IMF's member governments that had eighty-five percent of the
total voting power voted in favor of the amendment.*^ Because the United
States holds over seventeen percent of the voting power and currently does not
support the SDRM, even if all other members endorsed the SDRM, it cannot
87
be enacted until U.S. officials endorse it and Congress approves it.
The goal of the SDRM is to create a formal insolvency regime that
predictably, expediently, and inexpensively restructures sovereign debts, that
protects creditors' rights, and that preserves the value of the sovereign's
^^  The SDRM was designed to give countries with unsustainable ^'
^* See Galvis & Saad, supra note 74.
*' See Krueger, supra note 32. While this version is the one currently debated, suggestions for a formal
statutory insolvency framework have been made several times over the last two decades. See Kenneth Rogoff
& Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001, 49 IMF STAFF
PAPERS 470 (2002) (surveying earlier sovereign debt statutory proposals), available at http://www.imf org/
Extemal/Pubs/FT/staffp/2002/03/pdf/rogoff.pdf; Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 956.
^ ' KRUEGER, supra note 34, at 34.
^ ' See ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, art. XXVIII(a) (July 22,
1944) [hereinafter IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT] (discussing process to amend Articles), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf; Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power,
and IMF Board of Governors, at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/memdir/members.htm (last updated May
13, 2004) (calculating voting power of United States); see also Eichengreen, supra note 38, at 20.
** Int'l Monetary Fund, Report of the Managing Director to the Intemational Monetary and Financial
Committee on a Statutory Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/
omd/2003/040803.htm (Apr. 8, 2003).
^ ' The term "unsustainable debt" generally is defmed as a situation where "no feasible set of sustainable
macroeconomic policies . . . would enable the debtor to resolve the immediate crisis and restore medium-term
viability unless they were accompanied by a significant reduction in the net present value of the sovereign's
debt." KRUEGER, supra note 34, at 4. Factors to be considered when determining whether the sovereign's debt
is sustainable include whether govemment leaders can mobilize and sustain support for their debt adjustment
efforts, how the sovereign's economy likely will respond to economic policies designed to remedy the
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an incentive to initiate early restructuring agreements, while at the same time
ensuring that countries with sustainable debts are not given an incentive to
opportunistically suspend payments rather than adjust their economic
policies,'" Quickly facilitating the sovereign's return to medium-term
viability, the IMF concluded, would help reduce the overall cost of the
restructuring process, would prevent sovereign assets and reserves from
being exhausted, and would limit the economic dislocations associated with
default,'^
The SDRM is modeled after principles contained in Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.'^ In its current form,'" the SDRM could be initiated by any
sovereign that represented that its debts were unsustainable, ^ as long as that
representation is not subject to challenge by creditors.'^ While the most recent
version of the SDRM does not advocate imposing an injunction against
creditor collection activities,'^ earlier versions of the SDRM recommended a
limited stay against creditor enforcement proceedings if approved by a
supermajority of creditors.'^ Because one of the goals of the SDRM is to
preserve the country's asset values, the availability of a stay was deemed
necessary to prevent creditors from engaging in a "grab-race" for assets.
Preventing creditors from seizing available assets or otherwise seeking
repayment of their claims through national courts would also eliminate
disruptions to the sovereign's predefault (or early default) debt restructuring
negotiations with its creditors. Thus, as long as the country implemented a
sensible economic adjustment package and negotiated in good faith on a
sovereign debt crisis, and the impact of those economic policies on the domestic financial sector, Krueger,
supra note 29.
'" KRUEGER, iwpra note 34, at 4-5.
" The IMF notes that the SDRM, to be successful, must be part of an overall effort to strengthen the
framework for crisis prevention and resolution, including the IMF policies on lending into arrears and access
to IMF resources. See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 88.
'^ KRUEGER, supra note 34, at 5,
" II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330(2000),
' ' ' The SDRM has been retooled several times in response to creditor concerns about various provisions.
See Kenen, supra note 28, at 34-36, 37-39 (comparing changes in SDRM plans),
'^ Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 88, An earlier version effectively required sovereigns to get IMF
approval before activating the SDRM, See INT'L MONETARY FUND, THE DESIGN OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM—FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 25-27 (Nov, 27, 2002), available at http://www
,imforg/extemal/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702,pdf,
'* Int'l Monetary Fund, 5«pra note 88,
" See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 34,
'* Id. Earlier versions of the SDRM proposed an automatic stay on creditor enforcement actions and a
general suspension of debt payments during the restructuring. See Krueger, supra note 29, at 12 (discussing
earlier proposals). An earlier version of the SDRM also gave the IMF influence over stays. Id.
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nondiscriminatory basis,'' the SDRM-imposed stay would protect creditors by
preventing individual creditors from grabbing assets.'"^
To make the process more predictable and transparent to creditors, the
SDRM requires sovereigns to provide to creditors all information concerning
its indebtedness, including the claims it seeks to restructure (and those it does
not)."" To prevent sovereigns from favoring certain creditors, the SDRM
stays payments to nonpriority creditors.'"^ The SDRM suggests, however, that
loans made by official multilateral entities (including its own claims), debts
owed to official bilateral creditors in the Paris Club, and debts held by the
sovereign's domestic creditors be viewed as priority claims and, thus, be
excluded from the restructuring.'°^ The SDRM recommends against
restructuring this debt because of the unique nature of multilateral and bilateral
lending and because of concern that suspending debt payments to domestic
banks might render those banks insolvent and cause even greater economic
dislocation in the sovereign.'"'' The SDRM seeks to prevent holdout creditors
from suing sovereigns or attempting to attach sovereign assets in national
courts and attempts to do this by providing that a supermajority vote by
creditors in favor of the restructuring can bind dissenting creditors.'"^ Finally,
to encourage lenders to provide new financing, the SDRM affords priority
status for credit extended to the sovereign during the restructuring process.'"*
" Krueger, supra note 32.
""' See generally THOMAS H, JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 12-13 (1986)
(discussing bankruptcy's role as preventing creditors from engaging in inefficient grab rules of nonbankruptcy
law). While a few creditors have been able to force sovereigns to pay them off by filing an attachment
proceeding, some argue that an automatic stay is unnecessary because courts in the future are less likely to
enter judgments allowing holdout creditors to collect on their debts this way. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note
37; Nouriel Roubini, Private Sector Involvement in Crisis Resolution and Mechanisms for Dealing with
Sovereign Debt Problems (July 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.stem.nyu.edu/
globalmacro/fin_systems/roubinipsi.pdf
'*" KRUEOER, supra note 34, at 5.
""^ The earlier version of the SDRM proposals considered debt such as multilateral debt "non-impaired,"
meaning that it was excluded from debt restructuring. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 95, at 29.
'"^ Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 34, at B.2, B.3, B.4.
'** KRUEGER, supra note 34, at 18-19. The SDRM would restructure only debts claimed by the private
sector. See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 88 ("Eligible claims [under the SDRM] would exclude . . . claims
held by intemational organizations . . . and claims held by foreign governments or qualified govemment
agencies.").
'"^ See Krueger, supra note 71. Specifically, if seventy-five percent of the creditors holding the
outstanding principal of verified claims approve the fmancing, then this debt could be excluded from the
restructuring process. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 95, at 45.
'"* See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 88.
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The SDRM creates a new entity, the dispute resolution forum (DRF), to
resolve disputes that might arise during the debt restructuring. After
consulting with international organizations familiar with insolvency and debt
restructuring, the IMF director would select a pool of judges or private
practitioners to serve on the DRP, and this panel would then identify another
group of candidates who could be selected to help resolve a sovereign's crises.
Four members'"^ selected from this pool would then be impaneled by the
president of the DRF when the SDRM is activated. The DRF would notify
creditors, register their claims, and administer and verify the voting process
and also would have general jurisdiction over disputes arising during the debt
restructuring process. Finally, the IMF would be involved with resolving
disputes during the debt restructuring and would have supervisory control over
the DRF because eighty-five percent of the voting power of the Board of
Governors of the IMF could overrule DRF rules and regulations.'"^
b. Critique
The IMF maintains that a formal statutory mechanism will encourage
sound lending and borrowing decisions and discourage countries from
becoming over-indebted and facing default in the future.'"' For a number of
reasons, neither emerging market sovereigns nor their creditors supported the
adoption of the SDRM. While the SDRM encourages debtors and creditors "to
reach agreement of their own accord,""" the SDRM was widely criticized for
giving the IMF too much control over, and involvement in, the restructuring
process.'" That the SDRM excludes from coverage IMF debt and those of
other official creditors also did not encourage private lenders to embrace the
SDRM. Similarly, because the SDRM suggests that a sovereign's domestic
debt be excluded from the restructuring process, creditors outside the
sovereign's borders reasonably questioned whether such a system would
permit the sovereign to treat, unfairly and favorably, its domestic debt."^
" " One would actually make initial determinations and the other three would serve as an appellate panel.
See id.
'"8 Id.
" " INT'L MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM—-FURTHER CON-
SIDERATIONS 3-4 (Aug. 14, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pdr/sdnn/2002/081402.pdf.
' ' " Krueger, supra note 32.
' ' ' See. e.g., Taylor, supra note 73.
"^ See. e.g., Roubini & Setser, supra note 26, at 4, 5 (noting as one of the "basic problems that arise in a
restructuring" the "absence of an enforceable priority structure for the sovereign's own debt that helps to settle
questions of equity and the relative treatment of different creditor groups" such as domestic or foreign
creditors).
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Moreover, because it excluded domestic debt as well as the debt of IFIs, the
SDRM could fairly be characterized as being an incomplete debt restructuring
procedure.
Some concluded that the SDRM was rejected because it would make
restructuring too easy and ultimately would raise the price of credit."^ Others
suggested that because the SDRM decreased the probability of future IMF
bailouts, it would make emerging market lending more expensive."'' Others
were concerned that the SDRM appeared to anticipate that there would be a
single law that would be enforced by a single court and that such a regime
would override national law and private contracts to further the IMF's
developmental goals and would not protect creditor interests."^
Others questioned the IMF's underlying motivation for pursuing the
SDRM. Many argued that the IMF's interests were in conflict with the
interests of most private creditors, since it is a creditor and its overall mission
to rebuild countries gives it an incentive to push for legislation that requires the
private sector to make large concessions."* The IMF has publicly voiced its
frustration that money it and other public-sector creditors lent to sovereigns
facing either liquidity or solvency crises was used to repay in flail private
sector, often high-risk, debt."^ This frustration, critics contend, caused the
IMF to push aggressively for the approval of the SDRM because the SDRM
"^ See, e.g., Smitha Francis, IMF's SDRM Proposals: An Updated Critique of Conceptual Issues 2-3
(May 20, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (noting that "the subsequent debate [about SDRM] has degenerated
entirely into attempts by the [IMF] to consolidate its own role in global finance"), available at
http://www.networkideas.org/feathfn/may2003/IMF SDRM_Proposal.pdf; see also Arturo C. Porzecanski,
The Constructive Role of Private Creditors, 17 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 18, 22-23 (2003) ("What then is the
rationale of the G-7 and the IMF in devoting so much time and effort to facilitating future workouts of
sovereign debt to private creditors? Apparently, G-7 and IMF officials are trying to ameliorate the undesirable
consequences of their recent practice of bailing out certain troubled sovereign debtors."); Anthony Richards et
al.. Recent Proposals for Reform of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, BULL. (Res. Bank Austl.), Aug. 2002, at 62
(noting that "the presence of a restructuring fi'amework would reduce the incidenee of bail-outs by the IFIs and
the moral hazard that results when creditors continue lending in the expectation of sueh official support"),
ava/7aWea(http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Bulletin/bu_aug02/bu 0802 3.pdf.
' ' "• Scott, supra note 28, at 125.
' ' ' Eiehengreen, supra note 38, at 10-11.
' '* Scott, supra note 28, at 126 ("SDRM also has substantial design problems . . . . As a major 'priority'
lender, [the IMF] has an obvious interest in seeing that its own debt is repaid which may color its decisions on
many issues.").
" ' See Bulow, supra note 38, at 5 (contending that the inherently risky nature of emerging nation bond
issues gives it junk bond status); Eiehengreen, supra note 38, at 6-7 (arguing that the sovereign's citizens
effectively repay private loans through increased taxes); Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 30, at 6 (stating that
Fund Direetors stressed that IMF financing in any debt restructuring system should not be used to underwrite
private debt or "to finance payments to creditors whose elaims are being restructured").
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Structure essentially shifts the risk of default back to creditors, and away from
the IMF, and contains provisions designed to discourage private lenders from
relying on international public institutions to provide a rescue package when a
sovereign faces a financial crisis." Finally, some sovereigns may have
resisted enacting this statutory system because they feared the immediate
political ramifications if the system failed, and could not ensure that they
would receive credit for any future benefits from the legislation.
2. Benefits of a Statutory Insolvency Regime
That one proposed statutory regime, the SDRM, failed to gamer support
does not mean that sovereigns and their creditors would reject all statutory
approaches or that a contractual approach would be more effective than a well-
designed statutory approach. Most statutory insolvency proposals are modeled
after domestic legislation that governs insolvent businesses, principally
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Code."' Indeed, some resistance to embracing the
SDRM may result from concerns over the admittedly imperfect analogy
between reorganizing a business under Chapter 11 and restructuring a
sovereign's debts.'^" Likewise, critics may have rejected a statutory approach
based on Chapter 11 because of the somewhat common misperception about
the success corporations have when they reorganize under Chapter 11.'^' If
policymakers perceive that Chapter 11 or other statutory insolvency legislation
is inefficient or otherwise fails to resolve adequately a company's solvency
problems, they reasonably would be reluctant to embrace a statutory approach
to resolving a sovereign's solvency issues.'^ ^
" * See. e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign
Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J . 763 (2004); sources cited supra note 113.
' " See Marcus Miller, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts—or No Change?,
INT'L ECON. POL'Y BRIEFS, No. PB02-3, Apr. 2002, at 3 (noting that Jeffrey Sachs, Steven Schwarcz, Anne
Krueger, and consequently the SDRM, all advocate "an international bankruptcy court and/or workout
procedures loosely modeled on Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code"), available at http://www.iie.
com/publications/pb/pb02-3.pdf.
'^^ See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 34, at B.6 (discussing parallels between SDRM and national
bankruptcy laws and noting limitations in drawing parallels because sovereigns cannot be liquidated and
ereditors cannot demand a change in management); Roubini & Setser, supra note 26, at 6-7 (discussing the
similarities and differences between the sovereign debt restructuring process and corporate bankruptcy
reorganizations).
'^' While Chapter 11 does have its critics, supporters respond that, in the past twenty-three years. Chapter
11 has been used successfully to reorganize major corporations and has saved millions of jobs. See Kenneth
N. Klee, Creation of the Chapter II Reorganization Option, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 24, 24-25.
'^^ See Bulow, supra note 38, at 19 (stating perception that Chapter 11 is "a highly inefficient, time
consuming process to be avoided at all eosts").
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Certainly, some Chapter 11 reorganizations have been inefficient, too time-
consuming, and exorbitantly expensive.'^ ^ However, other filings (especially
some of the large corporate reorganizations filed since 1990) have been quick
and relatively inexpensive.'^'' Indeed, this change has caused some bankruptcy
scholars to conclude that the modem Chapter 11 reorganization is quicker and
more efficient than older corporate reorganizations because modem Chapter
1 Is are essentially used to enforce agreements debtors and their creditors reach
in a prenegotiated or prepackaged arrangement before the case is filed.'^^ In
any event, that some corporate reorganizations may not have been successful'^ *
and the SDRM may have had some design flaws does not mean that all
statutory frameworks should be rejected.
Despite the failure of the SDRM, there are several benefits to having a
statutory insolvency regime to resolve sovereign debt crises. First, a well-
designed collective insolvency proceeding would give sovereigns the option of
binding all creditors—bondholders, commercial banks, trade creditors, official
lenders, and domestic claimants—by majority vote, thus eliminating the
creditor coordination and holdout problems. In addition, a statute that gives
the sovereign at least a brief reprieve from paying its debts (a "standstill") and
from creditors' enforcement actions (a "stay") will give sovereigns time to
negotiate with all creditors simultaneously'^ ^ and will prevent individual
creditors or groups of creditors from disrupting the restmcturing either by
suing the sovereign in a national court or by attempting to exact unreasonable
'^^ See, e.g.. An Expensive Chapter II, CHI, TRIB,, Aug, 16, 1986, at C7 (discussing $27,5 million legal
and accounting fees in Baldwin-United Corp, Chapter 11 that lasted 2 1/2 years); Anthony Lin, Batson Bills
Enron $100 Million, N A T ' L L,J . , Dec, 8, 2003, at 12; Christopher Stem, WorldCom Fades into History, WASH,
POST, Apr, 19,2004, at El (discussing $800 million bill for lawyers, accountants, and consultants),
'^'' U.S. Airways, one of the huge corporate filings in 2002, filed for Chapter 11 on August 11, 2002 and
gained approval of its plan on March 31, 2003, Thomas Olson & Michael Yeomans, U.S. Airn'ays May Face
2nd Bankruptcy, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Dec, 19, 2003, available at http://www,pittsburghlive.
com/x/tribune-review/business/s_170804.html. In yet another example, Texaco filed for Chapter 11 on April
12, 1987, and the plan was confirmed on March 23, 1988, Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational
Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v, Texaco, 75 VA. L , RBV, 295, 306-09 (1989),
' ^ ' See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K, Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L, REV. 673, 674
(2003) ("Put concretely, in 84% of all large Chapter 1 Is from 2002, the investors entered bankruptcy with a
deal in hand."); A, Mechele Dickerson, The Many Faces of Chapter II: A Reply to Professor Baird, 12 AM.
BANKR, INST, L , REV. (forthcoming 2004) (discussing businesses that use Chapter 11 to implement a pre-
arranged merger or acquisition).
'^* See A, Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE
FOREST L, REV, 1, 32 n , l l8 (2003) (noting the difficulty in determining what constitutes a "successful"
Chapter 11),
' ^ ' Moreover, if the sovereign's debt crisis is caused by a liquidity problem that triggers creditor panic, the
standstill may serve as an alternative to IMF or other official financing. See Kenen, supra note 28, at 33.
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concessions during the restructuring.'^^ By giving sovereigns the option of
forcing all creditors to participate in, vote for, and be bound by the
restructuring, a statutory system can better provide incentives for lenders to
supply additional funds to distressed sovereigns.
A final benefit of a mandatory statutory approach is that it can eliminate the
first-mover disadvantage the first sovereign to enact a statutory regime may
have. That is, without a mandate to enact insolvency legislation, any sovereign
that unilaterally chose to enact debt restructuring legislation would be forced to
incur costs (to design the new statutory system and educate potential investors
about it) and might be viewed in the capital markets as less creditworthy. This
outcome would be especially likely for a debt restructuring statute, given the
function of insolvency legislation. That is, even if the benefits of the debt
restructuring legislation outweigh any harm to creditors, those benefits will not
occur in the short term and, indeed, may never occur if the legislation prevents
the sovereign from defaulting on its debts. Though having the legislation
might prevent future defaults, thus benefiting both sovereigns and their
creditors, it will be difficult to convey these benefits to potential lenders in the
short term. Finally, the political leaders who caused their country to adopt
such legislation likely would not get credit for future benefits because they
may not be in power when the benefits are realized.
Prior attempts to enact transnational corporate insolvency legislation
provide a good indication of the likelihood of sovereigns' acceptance of
uniform, mandatory sovereign debt restructuring legislation. Given the failure
of almost all attempts to enact corporate cross-border insolvency laws and the
understanding during those attempts that only fiexible, procedural legislation
likely would gamer support in the international community, a statutory
sovereign debt restructuring regime must be fiexible and sensitive to the
political realities that government leaders face when their countries confront a
financial crisis.'^^
A statutory system also can systematize the sovereign's treatment of "odious" debt and can give
creditors notice of how their claims may be treated if a subsequent politieal regime deems the debt to be
odious. The SDRM did not anticipate that countries would be allowed to use the SDRM to eliminate odious
debt because of concerns that sueh use would have adverse implications for the operation of capital markets.
See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 34, at D.IO.
'^' See BIRD, supra note 49, at 246 (suggesting that government leaders who are facing a contested re-
election will resist borrowing from the IMF because seeking such assistance likely will be viewed as a badge
of failure).
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III. CONSTRUCTING A POLITICALLY FEASIBLE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. Politics
Many of the sovereign debt restructuring proposals either discount or
simply ignore the political realities involved M'hen a sovereign faces a financial
crisis and then has to decide how best to resolve it.''"' Regardless of the cause
of a crisis, sovereigns avoid defaulting on their debt payments and delay
initiating debt restructuring negotiations because of the likely effects such
actions will have internally and, externally, in the capital markets. While it is
possible that making it easier to restructure debts may increase the sovereign's
moral hazard risk, this is unlikely given the current reluctance of sovereigns to
default on their debts despite the unlikelihood that creditors can enforce their
contractual rights by seizing sovereign assets. More importantly, as is true
with all forms of insurance, it would be impossible to completely eliminate the
sovereign moral hazard problem without drastically altering the terms of
sovereign lending, by, for example, providing that upon default title to a
sovereign's natural resources will be transferred to creditors or a neutral third
party. Because emerging nations would never agree to drastic results and, in
any event, it would be virtually impossible to enforce such results, any
approach to resolving the sovereign debt crisis must seek to contain, but not
eliminate, moral hazard.
A statutory approach to resolving sovereign debt crises should have as its
primary goal encouraging earlier restructurings. Most contractual proposals
focus on protecting or enhancing creditors' limited enforcement options and on
preventing sovereigns from dissipating tunds or transferring those flinds to
creditors within their borders.''" While creditors have argued against making
it too easy for countries to restructure their debts, given sovereigns' extreme
reluctance to initiate debt restructurings, few countries will willingly or
opportunistically initiate such restructurings.'^^ Entering into predefault
'^ ^ Krueger, supra note 32, at 7 ("[T]he political imponderable is whether our members are prepared to
constrain the ability of their citizens to pursue foreign governments through their national courts as an
investment in a more stable—and therefore more prosperous—world economy.").
' ' ' See Scott, supra note 28, at 119-20.
'•'^  Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 32, at 1360 (observing that "the eost and the consequences—politieal,
social and fmancial—of a generalized debt restructuring are typically so high that no sovereign takes this step
lightly"); Dickerson, supra note 125, at 31-32 (noting that, with respect to corporate reorganizations,
encouraging earlier Ulings by imposing additional duties on managers will not increase the risk of managers
filing for solvent companies); cf. Krueger, supra note 29, at 4 (noting Chapter 11 's recognition that early
reorganizations best protect economic value and stakeholder interests). Indeed, other than sovereigns'
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negotiations will benefit both debtor nations and their creditors because the
debt restructuring may prevent a default and its resulting political and
economic effects. Moreover, an earlier debt restructuring should lead to a
greater recovery for creditors that, in turn, ultimately should reduce the cost of
the sovereign's future borrowing. Whether sovereigns will be encouraged to
restructure their debts before a financial crisis will depend on whether they
perceive that they will receive increased benefits (either additional capital or a
write-off of existing loans) at relatively low costs (without IMF conditionality
and without triggering a political crisis).
Proposed reforms that give creditors the right to contiol the sovereign's
natural resources upon default, that transfer control rights to a neutral
international entity (like an international bankruptcy court or a central bank),
or that give a nonsovereign court jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes concerning
the restructuring of the sovereign's debts may be theoretically possible and
might ultimately produce the best economic result.'^ ^ Such proposals,
however, will be rejected by sovereigns. Moreover, even if IMF lending
encourages sovereign and creditor moral hazard, it is inconceivable that the
IMF will cease lending to distressed sovereigns any time in the near future.
Given this, the most sensible solution for the long-run economic viability of a
country (i.e., no IMF lending or a creditor- or IMF-controlled restructuring)
simply is not politically feasible in the short term. Likewise, it is unrealistic to
expect the international community to enact a uniform, comprehensive, one-
size-fits-all treaty that does not reflect either the different political needs and
pressures distressed sovereigns face or the differences in their debt structures
and is not flexible enough to be easily modified to adapt to new (or the
perception of new) circumstances.'^'' Instead, the international community
should take the "art of the possible" approach and seek an orderly, predictable
solution that is politically tenable for sovereigns in the short '^'
reluctance to restructure their debts early, most of the problems identified with maintaining the status quo are
creditor problems such as holdouts or the collection attempts of rogue creditors.
'^^ See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, WILL THE SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKET SURVIVE? 10 (Harvard Inst. of
Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2000, 2003) (discussing having an international entity take over a
defaulting sovereign's fmances).
'•''' Cf. Robert K. Rasmussen, supra note 27, at 62-63 (suggesting that a single bankruptcy regime might
not be appropriate for all corporate debtors and noting unlikelihood that "one bankruptcy rule, whatever it may
be, would be the optimal rule for all firms").
'•'' McKenzie, supra note 24, at 17 (suggesting that harmonization of transnational insolvency laws is not
feasible and arguing for an approach that is more attainable in the short term); Westbrook, supra note 22, at
2287 (arguing in favor of a global bankruptcy law but recognizing that such a law is not yet achievable).
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B. Statutory Framework
The statutory framework should mandate that sovereigns implement a
limited number of uniform substantive and procedural provisions. Mandatory
provisions are needed principally to eliminate the first-mover disadvantage.
Mandating that certain terms apply to all sovereign debt restructurings also
should remove some of the uncertainties associated with these restructurings.
Moreover, having some mandatory terms should help sovereigns and their
creditors focus on negotiating fmancial terms, not on creating the framework to
be used to encourage the restructuring discussions. There should not, however,
be a detailed blueprint for how each sovereign debt crisis must be resolved,
and any statutory framework must be flexible and comprehensive enough to
accommodate any changes in the sovereign's future borrowing. A flexible,
incremental framework is preferable to a rigid, uniform treaty because it can be
tailored to reflect the varied causes of sovereign debt crisis and the multiple
aims of debt restructuring. Requiring sovereigns to be bound by a limited
number of provisions in their debt restructuring process, but otherwise
permitting sovereigns to customize their debt restructuring procedures (just as
parties involved in transnational insolvency proceedings do by using
protocols), will more effectively resolve sovereign debt crises until all
sovereigns agree to a treaty or enact comprehensive debt restructuring
legislation.
;. Role of the IMF
Perhaps the most important requirement of any statutory approach is the
involvement of the IMF. Though one of the IMF's purposes is to provide
financial support to help its members "correct maladjustments in their balance
of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or
international prosperity," the IMF is not required to make its resources
available to its members unless the member provides adequate safeguards.'^ ^
While there should be a grace period to give sovereigns time to enact the
legislation, the IMF should condition its future lending on the borrower's
acceptance of the mandatory provisions of the statutory framework.'^ ^ The
'•'* IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 87, art. I(v).
'•" It is possible that this requirement also must be approved by a three-fifths majority of the voting
power. The United States should not be as reluctant to support such an amendment, however, because it does
not require the Fund to actually create a substantive statute that has significant IMF involvement. Moreover,
sovereigns should be more amenable to this solution because the IMF is not mandating the complete terms of,
or controlling, the outcome of the restructuring process.
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IMF should mandate that sovereigns include in their borrowing instruments
language that specifies that the IMF-mandated provisions, and any other
procedures the sovereign adopts as part of its national law, bind the parties and
that any disputes involving the debt restructuring process will be resolved by
the adjudicative authority selected by the parties.'^^ The IMF also should be
responsible for assembling and distributing to its members the "menu options"
that sovereigns that fail to implement comprehensive debt restructuring
procedures must use until they reach a permanent agreement with their
creditors. Other than these roles, however, the IMF should largely be removed
from negotiating or designing the restructuring process.
Given the controversy involving IMF lending, there should be a rebuttable
presumption that the IMF will not provide nonemergency financing to
sovereigns during debt restructurings unless the sovereign cannot borrow funds
from a capital market lender. Because of the potential of lender moral hazard,
the statutory framework should have a "bail-in" component that encourages
lenders to share a significant part of the burden of the sovereign's financial
crisis.'^' The size of the emerging capital lending market suggests that private
lenders can accommodate a sovereign's financial needs.''' Private lending is
preferable to IMF lending because it can be provided more quickly than an
IMF support package and also because private lenders, unlike the IMF, can
make lending decisions largely without regard to geopolitical concerns.'"" To
encourage private lending, the debt restructuring statute should mandate that
financing provided after the sovereign activates the debt restructuring process
will be excluded from the restructuring and that all existing sovereign debt will
be subordinated in payment to this postactivation financing debt.
A blanket prohibition on IMF lending, especially liquidity loans, is
inconsistent with the IMF's purposes and, moreover, is unrealistic. Similarly,
creditor nations, including the United States, would reject a blanket prohibition
on nonemergency loans if their domestic financial institutions have lent money
to the debtor countries.''*^ Moreover, it is unrealistic to assume that the United
'^ * Of course, a sovereign and its creditors could always choose not to be bound by these IMF-mandated
provisions. Making this choice would then require either existing or future lenders to provide a support
package to the sovereign because IMF financing would not be forthcoming.
'•" If, as scholars recently have argued, the sovereign's citizens ultimately bear the cost of the bailout of
private debt, then requiring a bail-in is even more appropriate. See Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettlemeyer,
International Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality, 16 ECON. POL'Y407 (2001).
''"' See Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 987.
''" See id. (noting relative speed of private financing compared to IMF support).
'•"^  See BIRD, supra note 49, at 6,44-49; MELTZER REPORT, as quoted supra note 51.
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States or other large IMF shareholders would allow the IMF to deny loans in
all circumstances to emerging nations that have critical democratic political
and economic systems. Finally, until there is a more predictable system in
place to help sovereigns resolve an insolvency or liquidity crisis and to prevent
capital outflows or a run on their domestic banking system, it is unreasonable
to expect that there will be no IMF lending.'''^
Rather than giving the IMF a prominent role in sovereign debt
restructurings, the sovereign and its creditors essentially should be allowed to
determine how the sovereign's debts will be restructured and the terms of the
restructuring. The IMF currently refuses to lend to sovereigns in distress if it
concludes that the payment stream in any proposed restructuring is not
consistent with the IMF requirements for medium-term debt sustainability''*'' or
it concludes that the sovereign will not meet certain core requirements as a
result of the restructuring. Removing the IMF from the restructuring process
gives sovereigns and their creditors an incentive to create a reasonable
payment plan knowing that if they fail to do so, there will be no official
financing to either repay existing private debt or otherwise ease the sovereign's
liquidity or solvency problems. If the parties prefer their plan notwithstanding
the objections of the IMF, or if they conclude that the IMF conditions are
unwarranted, then either creditors would need to agree to restructure their
loans in ways that would not require the sovereign to need additional capital,
the sovereign would need to find new additional financing, or one of the
existing lenders would have to agree to provide postactivation financing and,
in effect, replace the IMF as the lender of last resort.'''^
There, of course, is no guarantee that private creditors will lend in all
circumstances. If the capital markets refuse to lend to sovereigns while they
restructure their debts, then any loans provided by the IMF should have
essentially market interest rates and should be used to help stabilize the
country (or respond to a liquidity crisis), not merely to repay existing private
'•"^  See Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 963 (noting tliat the IMF's refusal to act as a iender of last resort is
politically untenable if sovereigns lack alternative funding sources).
I'M iffj'i^ MONETARY FUND, A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM—FURTHER REFLECTIONS
AND FUTURE WORK. 8 (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.imr.org/extenial/NP/pdr/sdrm/2002/
021402.pdf; see BIRD, supra note 49, at 93-126 (discussing IMF conditionality).
'''^ Uruguay appears to have been able to restructure its debts without accepting IMF conditions. See, e.g.,
Alan Beattie, Uruguay Provides Test Case for Merits of Voluntary Debt Exchange, FiN. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2003,
at 3 (discussing Uruguay's voluntary debt exchange and absence of direct compulsion of bondholder
participation in the exchange).
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lenders in full.''** To encourage sovereigns to restructure their debts early,
however, the interest rate of any IMF loan should vary based on when the
sovereign initiates debt restructuring discussions: sovereigns that initiate
predefault restructurings should receive a slightly below-market interest rate
on any subsequent IMF loan, whereas sovereigns that initiate postdeiault
restructurings should be forced to pay a higher, "penalty" interest rate.'''^
2. Other Mandatory Features
The statutory system must have procedures that ensure that the process is
predictable and transparent. At a minimum, soon after sovereigns activate the
debt restructuring process, they must be required to notify all their creditors,
disclose all their claims, and explain how they intend to treat those claims (i.e.,
which claims they intend to restructure, and which they intend to exclude from
the restructuring). Since it is unlikely that all creditors will participate in the
negotiation process, once the sovereign has reached agreement with a
sufficient majority of its creditors to approve the restructuring agreement, it
should be required to communicate the details of the restructuring to all
creditors.'''^ Having clear and predictable procedures will decrease creditors'
incentive to derail the process by suing the sovereign in national courts either
before or after a restructuring agreement is reached to collect their debts.
Moreover, a clear and predictable process should lower the cost of sovereign
lending because creditors will know how their claims likely will be treated in
the event of a default.
Most sovereigns that are facing a financial crisis will need some type of
temporary standstill of their debt obligations. Giving sovereigns a brief
reprieve from paying their debts may be ineffective, however, unless they are
'''* Cf. MELTZER REPORT, supra note 51, at 6-7 (recommenditig against IMF bailouts and in favor of
short-term liquidity assistance). While there should not be an outright prohibition against using IMF funding
to make debt payments, to avoid the creditor moral hazard problem, sovereigns should not be allowed to repay
private creditors in full using official financing.
Restricting the use of fiinds given during the restructuring would be similar to the restrictions private
lenders routinely place on the use of funds they provide to corporate debtors who have filed a petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Lenders routinely restriet the use of postpetition financing to
payment of operating expenses. See Richard Stem & Lori Lapin Jones, Lending to the Debtor in Possession,
in BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS FOR WORKOUT OFFICERS & LENDERS COUNSEL 1991, at 317, 332-33 (PLI
Commercial Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. A4-4348, 1991).
'*' But cf Kcnen, supra note 28, at 41 (arguing that countries that do not adopt legislation that would
include CACs should receive a reduction in their access to IMF credit).
'''* Sovereigns should consider relying on quicker, less expensive forms of communication and should
increasingly use the Internet to communicate with their creditors.
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also protected from creditor enforcement actions. Some commentators suggest
that an automatic stay, even if temporary, is unnecessary since creditors cannot
seize assets within the sovereign's borders and sovereigns are not likely to
leave seizable assets in creditor-friendly countries. However, there have been
successful creditor seizures in the past, and there is always the possibility that a
sovereign will have assets (for example, aircraft owned by the national airline,
foreign bank accounts, or foreign securities) outside of its borders that can be
seized by creditors.'''^ Moreover, because sovereigns often waive their
sovereign immunity defense in lending agreements, the threat that a creditor
might attempt to seize the sovereign's assets may cause the sovereign to
engage in inefficient activities designed to protect sovereign property, will
disrupt the restructuring process, and will give the sovereign an incentive to
pay the claim of the creditor who is threatening to attach assets.'^' Because it
is at least theoretically possible that a sovereign will have seizable assets
outside its borders, all sovereign insolvency legislation should give sovereigns
at least temporary relief (of no more than thirty days) from creditor
enforcement actions. To ensure the enforceability of this provision, all lending
instruments should give the sovereigns' courts exclusive jurisdiction over any
creditor enforcement litigation that arises during a debt restructuring.
To address the collective action problem, the statutory framework must
mandate that decisions made by a majority of creditors will bind dissenting
creditors. The sovereign (if it enacts comprehensive legislation) or the
sovereign and its creditors (if they use a protocol) should decide whether the
percentage would be a simple majority or a supermajority. There also should
be a mandatory provision that explains how creditors will be selected to serve
on a creditor committee, assuming one is appointed.
'*" See Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 365 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that vulture
ereditor attached sovereign's interest payments on bond that were held in foreign bank account); see also
David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority looting Provisions Do It Alt?, 52 EMORY L.J. 417, 423 (2003) (noting that
the stay is not as self-cvidently necessary for sovereigns, but stressing that in some circumstances sovereigns
would face a risk of asset seizure if no stay is imposed); Krueger, supra note 32 (discussing attachment of
Peruvian assets in United States and Peru's decision to settle with creditor rather than be pushed into default).
" " For example, the President of Argentina reflised to travel to Europe after Argentina defaulted on its
debts for fear that the presidential plane would be attached by creditors. See The IMF and Argentina, WASH.
POST, Mar. 12, 2004, atA22.
' " See Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 1028 (suggesting waivers of sovereign immunity are common); see
also Michel Camdessus, Capital Flows, Crises, and the Private Sector, Remarks to the Institute of International
Bankers (Mar. 1, 1999) (advocating temporary halt to creditor litigation to "maintain order" and prevent
disruptive and unnecessary litigation), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/1999/030199.htm.
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While sovereigns, their creditors, and the IFIs have consistently rejected
suggestions to create a permanent international bankruptcy court, some type of
administrative or adjudicatory body will be needed to resolve disputes between
the sovereign and its creditors.'^^ Even though most large firms that
reorganize under U.S. bankruptcy laws use prepackaged or prenegotiated
plans,''^ the debtor and its primary creditor(s) still need an adjudicative body
to implement their agreement.'^ "^ One way to create such a "restructuring
panel" would be to have a standing ad hoc panel of global insolvency experts
who either volunteer to serve on the panel or are nominated by sovereigns or
their creditors. While representatives of an IFI like the IMF are obvious
choices to serve on the panel because of their expertise in international
insolvency matters, the IMF is a creditor with inherent conflicts of interest, and
some emerging nations perceive that the IMF serves the interests of only its
creditor member nations.'^' Because of this, IMF representatives should not
serve on the panel. On at least an annual basis, five members from the panel
should be selected to serve on the restructuring panel in the event the sovereign
needs to restructure its debts that year.'^ ^ Sovereigns should have the right to
select two panelists, their creditors should have the right to select two, and
those four would be required to select the fifth member (who would chair the
panel).'"
C. Substantive Menu Approach
If a sovereign chooses to enact only the IMF-mandated debt restructuring
provisions, it could then customize the rest of its debt restructuring process on
an ad hoc basis. Allowing sovereigns to customize the process they use to
resolve a financial crisis is similar to an approach debtors and their creditors
use in transnational insolvency legislation—the protocol. Because no
"^ See Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 1019 (discussing failed attempts by G-7 nations to create an
international bankruptcy agency).
"^ See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 125, at 674 n.5.
"' ' See Dickerson, supra note 125, at 2-3 (noting that judicial mechanism is needed to implement the
terms of pre-arranged corporate reorganizations); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A
Response to Baird and Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645, 666-70 (2003).
" ' See Bulow, supra note 38, at 16 (arguing that the IMF and World Bank "get a bad rap" by being
characterized as only "doing the bidding of the large creditor countries").
" ' Selecting the panelists annually before the sovereign is at risk of default should generally decrease the
likelihood of capture and should specifically help prevent sovereigns or their creditors from selecting panelists
who are known to hold certain views concerning the sovereign's financial crisis.
' " See Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 1010 (posing other models for resolving sovereign debt restructuring
disputes); Scott, supra note 28, at 134 (discussing similar procedure used for NAFTA whereby each party
chooses members of the dispute resolution panel with a neutral party selected as the tie-breaker).
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international treaty or statute regulates transnational insolvencies, multi-
national businesses use private protocols, essentially mini-treaties, to create or
coordinate the procedures that will be used to govern the insolvency
proceedings. Protocols have been used in many of the larger transnational
insolvencies,'^^ and parties appear to prefer them because they can be tailored
to fit the particular circumstances involved in cross-border proceedings.
Giving sovereigns the authority to make incremental changes to their debt
restructuring procedures also gives the international community time to review
the various terms that could be included in a debt restructuring treaty and to
gauge the market's reaction to those terms outside the more formalized context
of a treaty drafting process.
Despite the benefits of allowing the parties to customize the debt
restructuring process, until the sovereign and its creditors reach a permanent
agreement, default terms—i.e., a temporary protocol—will be needed to
govern the debt restructuring. At least thirty days before activating debt
restructuring negotiations, the sovereign should be required to prepare the
temporary protocol and present it to its creditors. To ensure that sovereigns
protect creditor interests, they should be required to construct a temporary
protocol by selecting options from a menu jointly created by representatives of
creditor groups (like the Emerging Market Creditors Association or the
Institute of International Finance) and representatives of IMF emerging natioh
members. The joint drafting committee should pair prosovereign options with
procreditor options and, to the extent possible, should use options that exist in
current insolvency laws.'^' The committee should then present its menu to the
IMF for distribution to all its members.' Once the sovereign and its creditors
reach agreement on the nonmandatory terms of the debt restructuring, the final
protocol would replace the temporary one. If the final protocol is silent in
certain areas, then the menu options would serve as default terms.
One problem with using a menu or allowing sovereigns to customize their
legislation is that there will be no uniform insolvency text or a uniform
"* See Michael Fitz-James, Use of Cross-Border Insolvency Protocols on the Rise, CORP. LEGAL TIMES
INT'L, May 2002, at 1 (explaining that bankmptcy protocols were bom of necessity in 1991 during the "fraud-
ridden bankruptcy of Maxwell Communications Corp.").
" ' See Rasmussen, supra note 27, at 100 (explaining that options on a bankruptcy menu preferably
incorporate existing law to reduce costs ofleaming unfamiliar rules).
" " Having interested parties create a framework has been mentioned by IMF representatives in the
context of creating a "Code of Good Conduct." See Kjueger, supra note 29, at 6 (suggesting that Code be
developed by debtors, their creditors, and other interested parties, including the IMF); see also Roubini &
Setser, supra note 26, at 8-10 (discussing various proposals for codes of conduct).
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interpretation of that text. Because the menu options would not be included in
the sovereign's debt restructuring legislation, creditors could not use prior
restructurings to calculate the likely treatment of their claims in the event of a
sovereign default. Also, because sovereigns would have different insolvency
procedures, creditors would be required to learn each sovereign's procedures,
which may increase the cost of sovereign lending. Because sovereigns will be
required to enact the IMF-mandated terms discussed in Part III.B, however,
creditors will generally understand how the debt restructuring process will
proceed. Moreover, creditors already must consider a number of varied factors
that are unique to each sovereign when pricing sovereign debt. Thus, any
additional costs they might incur in estimating how their claims will be treated
during a restructuring should not significantly increase the cost of sovereign
lending. More importantly, while a predictable, consistent rule would be the
best result, the rejection of the mandatory, uniform provisions contained in the
SDRM, the fact that CAC terms in new bond issues are not uniform,'*' and the
earlier rejection by the international community of uniform transnational
insolvency legislation all suggest that at least in the short term an ad hoc
framework is the most politically feasible.
The list of paired options, discussed immediately below, is by no means a
comprehensive list of all possible menu options. Instead, these options are
designed to be representative of the types of items that could be included in the
sovereign's temporary protocol.
/. Restrictions on Sovereign Activation Plus No Creditor Committee
Many suggest that making debt restructurings too easy will increase the
number of opportunistic defaults. Mandating that sovereigns make certain
quantitative financial showings, like requiring that the IMF certify that the
country has "unsustainable debt," would be one way to decrease the likelihood
of opportunistic defaults.'*^ Permitting the IMF to make the threshold
determination of whether the sovereign has "unsustainable debt" likely will be
controversial and runs the risk of being politicized just as some argue current
'*' See Galvis & Saad, supra note 74, at 2.
'^ ^ A similar mechanism, termed "means testing," has been proposed during bankruptcy reform debates in
the U.S. Congress for the last several years. This test purportedly would counter bankruptcy abuses and
establish a more rigid test to determine when and how individual debtors must repay creditors. See, e.g.,
Dickerson, 5upra note 126, at 105 n.63.
2004] DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1035
IMF lending decisions are.'*^ In addition, "unsustainable debt" is not a term
that can be easily defined and, moreover, is a term that is manipulable.'*'' If
the IMF determines that the debt is unsustainable, however, then the sovereign
should be allowed to activate the debt restructuring process.
Because an entity other than the sovereign would be involved in critically
examining the sovereign's financial predicament early in the debt restructuring
process, this option should be paired with an option that eliminates the
automatic appointment of a creditors' committee. Appointing a committee
necessarily will increase administrative costs, which likely would be borne by
the sovereign (as is true in U.S. corporate reorganization proceedings).'
Moreover, if a creditor committee is appointed and the sovereign is required to
pay the committee's costs, the sovereign and possibly the restructuring dispute
panel will be required to determine whether the committee's expenses are
reasonable.'^* Any restrictions on a sovereign's ability to initiate the debt
restructuring may delay the process and increase the costs of the restructuring.
Delaying (or eliminating)'*' the creation of the creditor committee will
alleviate the need for sovereigns to negotiate with that group, at least at the
beginning of the case, and should, accordingly, save time and decrease overall
costs.
2. Good Faith Initiation Requirement Plus Automatic Creditor Committee
An earlier version of the SDRM prevented a sovereign from activating a
restructuring unless the IMF certified that its debts were unsustainable. The
current version is more deferential to sovereigns and gives sovereigns the
unilateral authority to initiate the debt restructuring mechanism. Creditors
could not challenge the sovereign's determination that it needed to restructure
its debts, and sovereigns are not explicitly required to act in good faith when
" ^ See PATRICK BOLTON, TOWARD A STATUTORY APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING:
LESSONS FROM CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AROUND THE WORLD 29 (Im'l Monetary Fund Working
Paper No. 03/13, 2003) (characterizing it as "more an art than a science"), available at http://www.imf.
org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0313.pdf.
'*^ Academic and policy commentators who have commented on the SDRM suggest that the term
"unsustainable debt" is not capable of being defined in precise, nonmanipulable terms. Indeed, the First
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Anne O. Krueger, has stressed the difficulty of determining whether
debt is sustainable and admitted that it "is not an exact science." Krueger, supra note 29, at 2.
'*' See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(F) (2000).
'** In corporate reorganizations, the Office of the United States Trustee appoints committee members and
all parties in interest have the right to object if they conclude that the committee's expenses are not reasonable.
'*' Sovereigns that have relatively simple debt structures and a limited number of creditors should be able
to negotiate the terms of the restructuring without the need for a creditor committee.
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they activate the debt restructuring process. If sovereigns are allowed to
activate the debt restructuring process unilaterally, they should at a minimum
face a financial penalty if it is later determined that it defaulted on its debts or
attempted to force its creditors to restructure their debts in bad faith.
To protect creditors from potentially opportunistic restructurings, giving
sovereigns a unilateral right to activate debt restructuring in good faith should
be paired with the automatic appointment of a creditor committee. How
creditors would be notified that the debt restructuring process has been
activated, how they will be represented during the restructuring discussions,
and how members of the creditor committee will be selected would be IMF-
mandated uniform terms in all debt restructuring statutes. Because sovereigns
will be required to provide financial information to creditors, having a creditor
committee automatically appointed would give creditors an early opportunity
to help shape the form of the restructuring agreement or to determine that the
sovereign activated the process in bad faith.
3. Permanent Automatic Stay Plus Enhanced Creditor Control over the
Restructuring
Few sovereigns would want to have an involuntary debt restructuring
because of the likely harm in both the capital markets and their domestic
economies and because of the likely political fallout associated with a third-
party declaration that the sovereign is insolvent. Indeed, no version of the
SDRM gave creditors the right to activate a debt restructuring because of the
effect this would impose on sovereign rights. The SDRM also did not give
creditors the authority to force sovereigns to submit a timely restructuring
agreement nor did it allow creditors to terminate restructuring discussions that
had reached an irreconcilable impasse.
One of the most controversial provisions in the SDRM involved the stay of
creditor enforcement actions. Because the potential harm caused by a creditor
attachment of sovereign property is great, there should be a mandatory thirty-
day stay. If the sovereign has a complicated debt structure, however, it likely
would benefit from a more extended stay. If the sovereign anticipates that it
will seek a permanent stay or that it wants the ability to extend the stay over
the objection of its creditors, creditors should be allowed to either (1) force the
sovereign to engage in debt restructuring discussions, (2) force the sovereign to
'** At a minimum, the sovereign should be required to pay any expenses a creditor incurs as a result ofthe
improper debt restructuring.
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submit a timely restructuring agreement, or (3) force the sovereign to terminate
futile debt restructuring discussions. Thus, if the sovereign's temporary
protocol indicates that it will seek an extended stay, creditors should be
allowed to prevent the debt restructuring by asking the IMF to certify that the
debt is sustainable.'*' Because sovereigns are required to give their creditors a
copy of the temporary protocol thirty days before the restructuring is activated,
creditors who object to a permanent automatic stay (or to the sovereign's right
to request an extension of the stay) could attempt to prevent the restructuring
altogether by requesting a certification by the IMF that the sovereign's debts
are sustainable. Creditors should also be allowed to petition the debt
restructuring panel to either terminate a restructuring (or exclude certain
creditor debt from the restructuring) if it appears that the sovereign is not
negotiating in good faith or is unwilling to prepare a timely written
restructuring agreement.
4. Restructuring Official Debt Plus Superpriority Treatment
The IMF has argued against requiring sovereigns to suspend debt payments
to multilateral or bilateral creditors or forcing sovereigns to restructure that
debt because of the unique nature of public-sector lending.'^° Excluding
official creditor debt has been challenged by critics of the SDRM as unfairly
favoring this debt, especially since IMF and other multilateral creditor loans
are almost always paid in full (likely because the sovereign anticipates that it
will need more funds from these creditors in the future).'^' One way to address
the perception that excluding debt favors certain creditors is to require the
sovereign to include all official debt in the restructuring but to give the official
lenders priority in payment as to all claims except those of the lender who
provides financing during the restructuring.'^^ Giving IMF loans priority in
' " Likewise, if the sovereign has enacted comprehensive debt restructuring legislation that provides for a
permanent stay, creditors should be allowed to ask the IMF to certify that the sovereign is facing a fmancial
crisis that would warrant a debt restructuring and, upon receiving such a certification, should be allowed to
force the sovereign to initiate debt restructuring negotiations.
' ™ See supra note 104.
' " Another reason IFI debt may be repaid is that it is always a relatively small percentage of the total
sovereign debt and the loans have below-market interest rates. See Bulow, supra note 38, at 10.
"^ The Bankruptcy Code uses this approach. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)-(4) (2000) (giving priority
to employee payments); id. § 5O3(b) (permitting priority for administrative expenses); id. § 507(a)(7)
(affording this status to alimony and child support claims).
Of course, if IMF debt is restructured and the IMF is required to forgive some or all of its loans, its
ability to make future loans may be compromised because it is unlikely that its large creditor members will be
willing to accept an increase of their quotas in the future because of prior restructurings. See Int'l Monetary
Fund, supra note 34, at B.4.
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payment also should help decrease the lender moral hazard problem. That is, if
creditors know that (1) IMF loans will have payment priority in a debt
restructuring, (2) the IMF presumptively will make only liquidity loans during
the restructuring, (3) any nonemergency IMF support package will be offered
only if private lenders refuse to lend, and (4) any postactivation financing will
have priority in payment before the preactivation official creditors' debt, they
should be less likely to engage in risky lending practices. Moreover, if private
lenders know that postactivation financing will have priority over claims of
official creditors, they should have a greater incentive to loan to the sovereign
during the debt restructuring.
5. Excluding Domestic Debt Plus Higher Voting Requirements
Some have argued against including domestic debts in the restructuring
process because of the concern that restructuring those debts and reducing the
debt the sovereign owes to its domestic banking (or pension) systems will
threaten the viability of the sovereign's financial system by eliminating
savings, decreasing the availability of credit to the private sector, and generally
disrupting the bank's payment system.'^ ^ In response, commentators suggest
that allowing sovereigns to continue to pay the claims of domestic creditors
increases the likelihood that the sovereign will use its available assets to pay
the debts of creditors within its borders and, thus, would have little remaining
to pay private lender claims.'^'' One problem with requiring sovereigns to
adopt a blanket rule on whether domestic debt should be excluded is that the
relative amount of sovereign domestic debt may vary greatly depending on the
sovereign's debt structure.''^ Given the amount of domestic debt some
sovereigns have, however, it is crucial that external creditors are given some
assurances that their claims will be treated fairly during the debt restructuring.
If the sovereign wants to exclude domestic debts fi-om the restructuring
process, then this option should be paired with an option that significantly
increases the percentage of creditors needed to approve the debt restructuring.
Increasing the voting majority needed to approve the restructuring will force
sovereigns to treat nondomestic debt fairly while still giving them the option to
"•' See Gelpem, supra note 35, at 221-22; Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 30, at 3.
" ' ' See supra note \12.
" ' For example, Brazil's domestic debt is nearly five times the size of its external debt. See Gelpem,
supra note 35, at 221.
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discriminate in favor of domestic debt.'^ * In contrast, if sovereigns are willing
to include domestic debt in the restructuring, they should be allowed to have
their restructuring plans approved by a smaller percentage.
6. Automatic Creditor Committee Plus Lower Voting Threshold
If creditors deem it crucial to have a mandatory creditor's committee, then
this requirement should be paired with an option that allows the sovereign to
have a lower voting threshold to approve the restructuring. If creditors have
not been actively involved with the restructuring process, or have received
only the IMF-mandated information, then a higher voting percentage (of, for
example, at least seventy-five percent) would be reasonable because they may
not understand how the sovereign intends to restructure its debts and may not
have had an opportunity to raise objections to, or help mold, the restructuring.
Though all sovereigns would be required to give creditors information
concerning their debts and to identify which debts they intend to restructure, a
working creditor committee will have a greater opportunity to negotiate with
the sovereign. Moreover, assuming the sovereign and creditors are negotiating
in good faith and are willing to make reasonable compromises,'^^ the creditors
who likely would vote against the debt restructuring would be the opportunistic
holdout creditors, and it is fair to have the majority of creditors bind these
holdout creditors to a reasonable restructuring.
7. Cramdown Plus Fairness Protections for Creditors
In corporate reorganizations, debtors can confirm a plan of reorganization
over the objection of a dissenting class of creditors (i.e., the "cramdown") if
certain conditions are met."^ Though some commentators have discussed
including a cramdown provision in a statutory insolvency system, and have
suggested that sovereigns be allowed to group creditors in classes,'^' the
SDRM does not endorse the concept of mandatory class voting or the use of a
cramdown.
'^* Whether that percentage should be 75% (as favored by the G-7), or 90% (as recommended by private
creditors), should be decided by the drafting committee. See Taylor, supra note 73.
'^' Most Chapter 11 plans are consensual, and modem ones are prearranged before filing. See Baird &
Rasmussen, supra note 125, at 674.
"* 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2000). A Chapter 11 debtor can ask the court to confirm a plan over the
objection of creditors if the court concludes that the plan is fair and equitable (generally, that it satisfies the
absolute priority rule) and that it gives the dissenting creditor at least as much as it would have received in a
hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. Id.
' " See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 118, at 793-801.
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If sovereigns want the ability to place creditors in classes and then cram
down a restructuring plan over the objection of some of those classes, then this
option should be paired with one that ensures that the voting process is fair.
Chapter 11 debtors can gerrymander classes of creditors—that is, place
creditors in classes in such a way that ensures that at least one class of creditors
whose claims will not be paid in full will vote in favor of the plan (a
requirement for a cramdown under U.S. law).'^" Sovereigns should not,
however, be allowed to gerrymander classes. In addition, if national creditors
are included in the restructuring process, they should be placed in a class
different from offshore creditors to ensure that they do not dominate the class
and dilute the vote of the offshore creditors. While sovereigns should not be
allowed to gerrymander classes, sovereigns and their creditors should
otherwise be allowed to determine how to create classes or subclasses and
what percentage of affirmative votes is needed for a class to approve the debt
restructuring.
CONCLUSION
A solution to sovereign debt crises, like a solution to transnational
insolvencies, remains as a Holy Grail: "desirable but elusive, notwithstanding
1 RI
continuing efforts at many levels to attain it." Recent history suggests that
not all financial crises are the same and that resolving individual sovereigns'
debt crises may depend on the political and domestic economic pressures
facing the sovereign's leaders. Indeed, all proposed solutions to the sovereign
debt crisis concede that any solution necessarily will have political
implications and that sovereign nations likely will resist any attempt to force
them to be governed by the laws of another nation or to subject themselves to
the jurisdiction of another sovereign's courts.
The most politically feasible approach is to create a restructuring procedure
with negotiation-friendly measures that facilitate early debt restructurings.
'*" See II U.S.C. § 1129. Yet, while the practice of gerrymandering in the context of business
reorganization is not explicitly prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, there is a circuit split regarding when, if at
all, this reclassification may be permitted. See, e.g.. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture
(In re Greystone III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that multiple classification
"may only be undertaken for reasons independent of the debtor's motivation to secure the vote of an impaired,
assenting class of claims"). But see, e.g.. Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck
Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 1986) (permitting manipulation when there exists a
distinct "noncreditor interest").
'^' McKenzie, rapranote24, at 15.
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Rather than mandating that each sovereign enact the same debt restructuring
process, the IMF should mandate that sovereigns enact a limited number of
debt restructuring provisions in their domestic laws. Sovereigns should
otherwise be allowed to customize their debt restructuring statutes or processes
using menu options that best suit their political needs. Adopting a flexible
approach also gives the international community time to determine what types
of provisions should be included in a debt restructuring treaty and time to
create a more comprehensive solution to the sovereign debt crisis that can
respond to future changes in capital market financing.
